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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes partisanship in America. I lay out a new theory of
partisanship that shows that how strongly an American identifies with the Democrats
or Republicans is due to how likely he or she is to take sides in a conflict and join
groups generally. I use data from the American National Election Studies (ANES)
and a variety of statistical techniques to demonstrate this. Behavior scholars know
much about factors that pull Americans toward the Democrats or Republicans, but
little (until now) about how strongly an American is pulled toward either party.
Strength of partisanship influences almost all aspects of political behavior. Pure
independents, independents who lean toward one party, and weak and strong parti-
sans vary considerably in turnout, vote choice, and political knowledge. My theory
explains these differences and improves our understanding of political participation,
attitudes, and elections. These findings provide answers for why some people are ra-
bid partisans and others don’t care much about their party, and why many Americans
who favor one party prefer to remain nominally neutral.
Additionally, I use the conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship to
explain differences in strength of partisanship between women and men. I analyze
ANES data, and use difference-of-means tests and logistic regression to compare
partisanship between genders. I show that men’s greater tendency to judge things
and take sides in a conflict, and women’s greater tendency to join groups, explain
why women are more likely to identify as weak partisans and men are more likely to
identify as independent leaners.
Finally, I explain gender differences in the social identity and rational choice the-
ories of partisanship. I examine data from the ANES, National Annenberg Election
Survey, and Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, and compare models of par-
tisanship using regression techniques and model tests. Ideology and demographics
both significantly influence an American’s partisanship, but their relative importance
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is different for women and men. The rational choice model is comparatively better
for men, and the social identity model is comparatively better for women. These
results increase our knowledge of the gender gap in political behavior.
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I INTRODUCTION
Partisanship is the most important feature of political behavior today. What
party Americans identify with determines elections, who controls the Presidency,
Congress, and the Supreme Court, what kinds of laws are passed and what we think
of the, and public opinion on issues from anthropogenic global warming to Zionism.
Party identification is related to a host of seemingly non-political phenomena too.
Which party you identify with is linked to what you eat and drink, what you drive,
where you shop, what neighborhood you live in, what entertainment media you
watch, and even what your parents named you.
Today, the American dichotomy of party identification is incredibly meaningful.
The duelling labels of Republican and Democrat are not empty symbols, but red
and blue banners of enormous complexity. And those standards represent two sides
in intense conflict over offices, policies, and values. Partisans on both sides often
claim that they are fighting “for the future of America” or “The American Dream;”
it is (often) not hyperbole. The direction the Democratic Party and rank-and-file
Democratic voters would lead our country in is very different from the direction that
Republicans and typical Republican partisans would lead us in.
Some pundits and political scientists, tired of partisan bickering, negative ads,
and constant campaigns, wish for how things were in the 1950s, when partisanship
was not as adversarial as it is in 2014. These commentators lament partisanship and
wish for an end of parties or a nebulous moderation that trivializes the meaningful
choices of politically active Americans.
I chose to do this dissertation because partisanship is so significant. Indeed, I
doubt I would be a political scientist at all if it were not for the motivation of our
very partisan politics. I certainly would not care much about politics without it.
Like many strong partisans (as you will see), I tend to dualistically divide concepts,
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objects, and ideas into the very good and very bad, and be engaged and energized
by those I can categorize in such a bipolar way.
To enable social scientists and interested citizens to understand politics in Amer-
ica, particularly voting, elections, and public opinion, in this dissertation I create a
new theory of partisanship. I analyze and defend a meaning of party identification
that changes the way we understand strong Democrats, strong Republicans, and
everything in between.
Partisanship is conflict-oriented group identity. In the first substantive section of
this dissertation, I explain why two personality traits cause American identify as pure
independents, independent leaners, weak partisans, or strong partisans are. These
two traits, an indvidual’s joiner status and Need to Evaluate, strongly influence
strength of partisanship. These traits are independent from but related to both
rational choice and social identity theories of partisanship, and help bridge the gap
between them. My findings give political science a robust theory of strength of
partisanship for the first time.
In the second body section, I demonstrate that men and women vary in their levels
of Need to Evaluate and joiner status. Gender variation in these two traits creates a
significant portion of the gender gap in strength of partisanship, with women more
likely to identify as weak partisans and men more likely to identify as independent
leaners.
In the last substantive section, I explain gender variation in the sources of parti-
sanship. Ideology is a better predictor of partisanship than social group demograph-
ics for both men and women, but is comparatively better for men. Social group
demographics are comparatively better at explaining partisanship for women. Ad-
ditionally, the impact of demographic factors on partisanship varies for men and
women. These results add to our knowledge of the gender gap in political behavior.
2
II THE CONFLICT-ORIENTED GROUP IDENTITY OF PARTISANSHIP
2.1 Introduction
At first glance, political science seems to have thoroughly explained partisanship
in the mass public. We know the factors that determine an American’s choice between
the Republicans and Democrats, including parental inheritance (Niemi and Jennings
1992), income (Gelman et al. 2008), race (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), region
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), religiosity (Layman 2001), and ideology (Downs
1957), among many others. We know that partisanship is stable over time (Green,
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), though Americans occasionally switch parties on
the basis of their ideology (Carsey and Layman 2006). And we know that party ID,
along with ideology/issue positions and candidate evaluations, is part of the “iron
triangle” of factors critical to individual vote choice (Achen 1992, Jacoby 2010).
Beneath the surface, however, there is much about partisanship that political
scientists do not understand. On academic surveys, we rigorously measure parti-
sanship in terms of a seven-point scale1 that divides partisans into strong and weak
and independents into leaners and pure (see Bartels 2000 for one example), but we
don’t fully understand these categories. We can’t explain the difference between
weak partisans and leaning independents, for example. The most prominent anal-
ysis of leaning independents (Keith et al. 1992) tells us that leaning independents
and weak partisans are similar in many ways, but doesn’t articulate how they are
distinct, either theoretically or empirically. Furthermore, this topic has not been ro-
bustly re-examined in 20 years, and mass partisanship has changed a lot in the past
two decades. Political scientists lack a general theory that explains the distinctions
between strong and weak partisans, and pure independents and leaners as well.
1The scale runs from Strong Democrat to Weak Democrat to Independent, Leans Democrat to
Pure Independent to Independent, Leans Republican to Weak Republican to Strong Republican.
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Thus, scholars are surprisingly ignorant about the concepts and scale that we
are using to measure and analyze partisanship. This lack of understanding is due
to a larger knowledge gap. Political scientists who study behavior know a lot about
what determines whether a person leans to one side or the other, but relatively little
about what influences how strongly someone is pulled toward one party or the other.
Most of our record of investigating partisanship is in looking at why Democrat or
Republican, not why partisan or not partisan in general. And we need this. What
determines strength of partisan identification?
Political scientists must have a theory of party strength to complement theories
of party direction. In this paper, I explain partisanship as a conflict-oriented group
identity, and give us one. After describing why partisanship should be thought of as a
conflict-oriented group identity, I argue that an American’s Need to Evaluate (N2E)
and tendency to be a “joiner” strongly influence this identity. I explain how these
concepts can be measured, and demonstrate that they strongly affect an individual’s
strength of partisanship. Though their specific effects vary somewhat by party ID,
N2E and joiner status influence strength of partisanship for both Republicans and
Democrats; neither is significantly associated with favoring one party over the other.
I show that these two personality traits distinguish between different levels of par-
tisanship in theoretically expected ways. My theory generates specific predictions
about what kind of people identify at each level of the strength of partisanship scale,
and I find considerable support for these predictions. Finally, I create a two-by-two
typology of four categories that shows how an American’s tendency to be a joiner
and N2E interact with one another and strength of partisanship, and demonstrate
empirical support for these relationships. My conflict-oriented group identity theory
provides much insight into strength of partisanship.
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2.2 Literature Review
Contemporary scholarship offers two broad explanations for why people identify
as partisans. The first, derived initially from work by Campbell et al. (1960), is
generally focused around social factors like parental socialization (Niemi and Jen-
nings 1992), group membership and affiliation (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler
2002, Greene 2004), and generational cohort effects (Jennings and Markus 1984).
The second, more rationalist explanation dates back to Downs (1957) and primar-
ily analyzes mass partisanship in terms of ideology (Fiorina 1981, Abramowitz and
Saunders 2006) and elite issue positions and cues (Carsey and Layman 2006). These
two strains of research on partisanship can be generally labeled as “social identity”
theories and “rationalist” theories, and have provided behavior scholars with a great
deal of theoretical leverage.
Social identity theories, particularly as articulated by Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler (2002), argue that individuals align with the party whose social group
coalition is most similar to themselves. In effect, Americans are thought to choose
the party that answers the question, “which party has people most like me?” The
Democratic party, for example, has long been the home of unionized workers, the
poor, and people who are not very religious, and so according to social identity the-
ory, an agnostic poor member of the SEIU (Service Employees International Union)
is expected to be a Democrat regardless of his or her political ideology. The parti-
sanship of this individual’s parents and the party popular when this person became
politically active (cohort effects) are also often argued to have some effects on an in-
dividual’s partisanship, but social identity theory asserts that the main determinant
of partisanship is a party’s coalition of social groups.
For the most part, social identity theories provide a much richer description of
partisans than they do of independents. In doing so, they lack a good understanding
of the nature of partisanship. Independents are expected to identify only weakly with
both parties, have few emotional reactions to candidates, be relatively uninterested in
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politics, and be less politically active than partisans (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler
2002).2 Independents are people who do not fit well within either the Democratic
or Republican social group coalition or whose group loyalties are split between the
parties, such as Southern Jewish businesswomen.3
This simplistic explanation of partisanship has critical flaws. It says very little
about why Americans whose social group affiliations line up well with one party,
such as churchgoing white men with high incomes, would choose to be independent.
Conversely, citizens who strongly identify with the GOP or Democrats but are un-
characteristic of the parties’ typical social coalitions are a mystery for social identity
theories. They do not account for why some Americans identify weakly with a party,
and some strongly, or why most independents lean toward one party. In failing to
explain these groups, which constitute a large chunk of the American electorate, so-
cial identity theories fail to fully understand the nature of partisanship. There is no
social identity theory of strength of partisanship.4
Contemporary rationalist theories of partisanship are also incomplete. Rationalist
explanations of partisanship (Downs 1957, Fiorina 1981, Franklin 1992, Abramowitz
and Saunders 1998) argue that Americans choose the party (and candidate) with
policy views closest to their own issue positions and ideology. Conservatives choose
the Republican party, and liberals choose the Democratic party. The correlation be-
tween ideology and partisanship in the mass electorate has grown increasingly strong
in recent years (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998), as has the relationship between
specific issue positions and partisanship (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009). Consistent with
rationalist theories of partisanship, ideology is a strong predictor of which party cit-
2Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002, 40) also find evidence that independents move back
and forth over time between independence and affiliation with one of the two parties, but do not
attempt to explain this finding or incorporate it into their theory.
3These theories also assert that independents are likely to be the children of independents.
4What might one look like? Given the importance of social groups to social identity theories of
party direction, a social identity theory of strength of partisanship might suggest that how strongly
partisan an American is would depend on how well that person fit into each party’s social group
coalition. Pure independents would not fit at all in either party’s coalition, leaning independents a
little better, weak partisans a little better than that, and strong partisans best.
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izens vote for (Abramowitz 2010) and which party they identify with (Abramowitz
and Saunders 2006). Although a person’s partisanship affects his or her issue po-
sitions due to party elite cues, people do seek out and even switch parties on the
basis of their ideology (Carsey and Layman 2006). Furthermore, recent empirical
evidence indicates that rationalist, ideology-based explanations of mass partisanship
outperform social-identity-based explanations (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006).
Rationalist theories seem to explain the sources of directional partisanship quite
well, but have no explicit theory of strength of partisanship.5 According to rational
choice theories of partisanship, individuals pick a party based on whichever party is
ideologically closest to their positions. This explanation, however, does not distin-
guish between strong and weak partisans, or independent leaners and pure indepen-
dents. In effect, rationalist theories treat partisanship only as a three-point ordinal
variable6, even though political scientists often study strength of partisanship as a
seven-point scale.7
It is not clear how rationalist theories would explain variation in strength of par-
tisanship. According to rational choice theories of partisanship, behavior scholars
should observe relatively few independents (both pure and leaners), since even a
person who leans slightly left or right should choose the Democrats or Republicans
respectively. For the most part, issue positions in American politics fall on one ide-
5What might a hypothetical rational choice theory of strength of partisanship look like? It might
expect more extreme ideology at each level of partisanship, with pure independents the most moder-
ate and strong partisans the most liberal/conservative. However, moderates and the non-ideological
do not comprise a supermajority of independents. Independents are often ideological. Recent Gallup
polling finds that about 55% of independents identify as liberal or conservative (http://www.
gallup.com/poll/148745/Political-Ideology-Stable-Conservatives-Leading.aspx). In
addition, a rationalist theory of strength of partisanship might expect very few moderates
among weak or strong partisans. However, significant minorities of Democrats and Republi-
cans identify as moderate (39% and 24% respectively, http://www.gallup.com/poll/148745/
Political-Ideology-Stable-Conservatives-Leading.aspx).
6This variable runs from Democrat to Independent to Republican.
7It runs from Strong Democrat to Weak Democrat to Independent, Leans Democrat to Pure
Independent to Independent, Leans Republican to Weak Republican to Strong Republican. Some
scholars have critiqued this scale for not sufficiently accounting for the social identity aspects of
partisanship (see Greene 2002 and Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2010), but the seven-point scale
remains the primary way that political scientists understand partisanship.
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ological dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), so spatial calculations of ideological
distance are possible even among the mass public; a large and increasing percentage
of the mass electorate is able to position the Democrats correctly to the left of the
Republicans on an ideological scale (Abramowitz 2010). Yet, even though rationalist
explanations of partisanship might expect independents to be a small percentage of
the electorate, independents constituted between 35% and 45% of American public
in 2011 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx). Under
rationalist explanations of partisanship, primarily people who are non-ideological or
whose ideology is between that of the Republicans and Democrats (presumably some
moderates) are expected to identify as independent.
Thus, both social identity theories and rationalist theories fail to fully explain
partisanship. While useful, they view partisanship too simplistically, and do not
account well for empirical deviation from their descriptions. More critically, they
offer no real theory of strength of partisanship. Despite rationalist and social identity
theories’ specific explanations of what determines whether a person identifies as
Democrat or Republican, their inadequacy regarding strength of partisanship leaves
political scientists with a crucial gap in our understanding of political behavior. I
now turn to expounding a theory of strength of partisanship.
2.3 Theory
To build a useful theory of strength of partisanship, it is essential to examine
the nature of partisanship. Social identity theories have rightly pointed out that
partisanship is inherently a group identity. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002)
assert that “party identification, however, concerns the way in which people think
of themselves . . . What matters is one’s image of the social groups ‘Democrat,’
‘Republican,’ and ‘Independent’ and whether one includes oneself among them” (137,
italics theirs).
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Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, however, do not fully understand how people
form group attachments. In describing why people join parties, they write that
“our model is agnostic about whether people seek to save time or even to form social
attachments. We are satisfied by decades of social-psychological research on ‘minimal
groups’ showing that people readily form group attachments even when there seems
to be little or nothing at stake (Tajfel 1978)” (138). In other words, having valuably
observed that people identify as Democrats or Republicans on the basis of group
attachments, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler are content to accept that observation
simply because people have a tendency to join groups. They do not investigate why
this tendency to join is the case for political parties.
These authors not only refrain from theorizing about why people tend to join
groups in the context of partisanship, but actively mischaracterize how people form
group attachments. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler note that “given the human
penchant for embracing group distinctions, it seems unnecessary and potentially
misleading to explain party identification with reference to instrumentalities of var-
ious sorts” (138). They are effectively assuming here that people are equally likely
to join groups or think of themselves as part of one. This idea is false. For example,
libertarians are less socially connected to other people than liberals or conservatives
(Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, and Haidt 2012). Norrander (1997) finds that women
are more likely to be partisans than men because of “women placing a greater value
on connections with others” (464).
Partisanship and Joiners
Research on social capital and civic participation suggests that some people are
inherently “joiners” and others are not (Putnam 2001). Joiners are predisposed to-
wards becoming members of groups (e.g., bowling leagues, Bible studies, the Amer-
ican Heart Association, etc.) and participating in them, while non-joiners are not
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(Putnam 2001).8 Scholarship that draws on the concept of joiners typically measures
it by observing whether or not a survey respondent is a member of at least one so-
cial group or observing the number of groups he or she is a part of (see Baldassarri
2011). This concept, though simple, has been shown to explain a variety of social
phenomena, including an alleged decline of civic participation in America (Putnam
2001).9
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler’s (2002) assumptions about the tendency of
Americans to attach themselves to groups should therefore primarily hold for join-
ers. A rigorous explanation of party identification that draws from social identity
theories should thus incorporate the idea of joiners vs. non-joiners in its theory of
mass partisanship. Given what social scientists know about joiners, joiners should be
more likely to be partisans than non-joiners. Non-joiners should be more likely to be
independents, all else equal. In addition to whether a person is a joiner or not, the
number of groups a joiner is part of should influence his or her degree of partisanship.
The more groups a joiner is part of, the stronger that person’s partisanship should
be. There is some tentative evidence that this is the case (see Baldassarri 2011), but
this idea has never been the primary subject of thorough empirical test.10
The explanatory power of the concept of joiners has yet to be fully incorporated
into a general theory of strength of partisanship. Social identity theories point out
that people have a tendency to form group attachments. However, this tendency
varies widely based on the degree to which a person is a joiner or not. As a re-
sult, I believe an individual’s joiner or non-joiner status should be a key difference
8The concept of joiners has already begun to enter American popular culture. In the movie Iron
Man 2 (2010), for example, when it is suggested in a Congressional hearing that main character
Tony Stark become part of America’s military command structure, Stark responds by saying, “I’m
not a joiner, but I will consider Secretary of Defense, if you ask nice.”
9I say “alleged” because some authors are skeptical that the decline of civic participation includes
political activities like voting (see McDonald and Popkin 2001 for one example).
10Baldassarri’s (2011) initial findings are suggestive and useful, but are effectively an interesting
side note to a tangentially-related analysis. Her evidence on joiners is not subjected to the kind of
extensive testing necessary for it to be conclusive.
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between partisans and independents, regardless of their demographic identifications
(suggested by social identity theories) or ideology (suggested by rationalist theories).
Whether someone is a joiner or not should strongly influence whether they feel
that they have a stake in a party and have some of claim of abstract ownership
of it (as in, “our party is the party of free markets, and I’m doing my part by
giving money and by telling undecided James that he should vote for us”). This
idea of being a joiner being linked to feeling like a stakeholder and having a claim of
ownership is similar to the way people speak when they are part of clubs like the Elks
and Greek organizations. It is for this reason that we should expect that partisans
who are joiners will have a party ID that is more resistant to change than others’
when the party is unpopular or seems incompetent. Partisan joiners will respond to
poor performance or decisions they don’t like with thoughts like “I don’t like what
our leaders in Congress are doing and think they are betraying the true spirit of our
party, but they’ll get their heads turned around once they talk to the rest of us.”
These kinds of thoughts are typical of existing descriptions of strong partisans (see
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). They can be disappointed with their party or
speak out against it on a survey without disavowing their party or switching parties
or becoming independent. The idea of joiners as predisposed to being partisans
accounts for existing knowledge and improves our understanding of what partisanship
is. It will take a lot of disagreement and disappointment with party leaders before
people who are joiners abandon their party. To use the language of sports, partisan
joiners not only root for the home team but feel that they are a part of it and
have some claim to it.11 Poor management of a team is going to lose fans who just
root for the team (independent leaners) before it loses people who vaguely work
for the franchise, like low-level talent scouts, boosters, and groundskeepers. Joiners
will feel that they have buy-in to their party’s organization, and so they should
be highly resistant to changing party ID or becoming independent leaners or true
11For those not as familiar with sports, one could also think of partisanship as being part of a
conflict-oriented tribe, like the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.
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independents. Conversely, non-joiners’ tendency to be independents should explain
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler’s interesting finding that independents are unstable,
moving back and forth over time between independence and affiliation with one of
the two parties. Independent non-joiners should not see themselves as stakeholders
in their “team” or chosen identity, whether they are independent leaners or true
independents. They will therefore be more likely to change their affiliation in response
to external information or changing evaluations of party performance.
The latent individual trait of being a joiner is thus part of the nature of parti-
sanship. In having a strong influence on whether a person identifies as a partisan or
independent, it should account for a variety of political phenomena. These ideas will
be elaborated on later. I now return to describing the other key aspect of strength
of partisanship.
Partisanship and Need to Evaluate
Partisanship in the mass public is inherently a group identity. It is not just a
group identity, however; it is a conflict-oriented group identity.12 This is a critical
difference between partisanship in contemporary America and other kinds of group
identities. Mass partisanship is conflict-oriented by virtue of the structure and char-
acteristics of political competition in modern America. Federico (2007) notes that
“like evaluations of conservatism and liberalism, evaluative attraction to the Repub-
lican and Democratic candidates − and the parties that field them − can potentially
be organized in either a bipolar fashion or a bivariate fashion (Green, 1988; Weisberg,
1980)” (540). Nationally, there are effectively only two party choices in American
politics, the Democrats or the Republicans.13 As a result, choosing to identify as a
12Communications scholars have argued that rhetorical identification is inherently conflict-
ual;Burke (1969) notes that “identification implies division” (45) and “to begin with ‘identification’
is, by the same token, though roundabout, to confront the implications of division” (22).
13On the few occasions when 3rd-party Presidential candidacies have won notable amounts of
support from the public, such as Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party candidacy in 1912 and
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Republican or Democrat is equivalent to choosing a side in a conflict. Each party
can be thought of as trying to win a zero-sum “game” in which it wants its candi-
dates to win elections. However, each party’s goal is not satisfied solely by winning
elections. In the contemporary United States, polarized party activists and political
elites that are sharply divided along ideological lines want to enact policies that fit
their ideology about what constitutes an ideal society.14 Furthermore, whether the
winning party is able to do this is often dependent on winning not just the Presidency
and majorities of Congress, but supermajorities (due to filibusters, veto overrides,
Constitutional amendment requirements, etc.). Because laws and appointments can
be changed, no triumph is ever final in politics; the conflict is ongoing and never
ends.
These characteristics of party conflict in contemporary America make becoming a
partisan different from joining most other kinds of social groups; affiliation with other
social groups is not often conflict-oriented in the same zero-sum way. To understand
this idea, consider the characteristics of other kinds of social groups. Being a “joiner”
in general is not an act of conflict. Many groups are not in direct competition with
another group, and are often centered around some task or activity that members
enjoy or promote (e.g. bowling leagues, the Make-A-Wish Foundation, a Bible study,
the Humane Society, Suncoast Sports Association, Random Acts of Kindness, etc.).
Even some kinds of social groups that at least indirectly compete with other
groups for membership or support (Greek organizations and fraternal organizations
like the Elks and Lions, among others) are usually not in direct conflict with each
other. For example, if there are 10 fraternities at a university, they all compete for
members among the student body or the subset of the male student body that is
interested in joining a fraternity. However, each fraternity may selectively recruit
different kinds of members (one is the football fraternity, one is the engineering
Ross Perot’s Independent candidacy in 1992, their primarily personalist parties have lost relevance
relatively quickly after their defeats.
14Party goals could include things like patronage as well.
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fraternity, one is the nerd fraternity, one is the nice guy fraternity, etc.), such that
many of them do not compete over the same prospective members. It is possible
that one man could be a nerdy, engineer-major gentleman who also plays football,
but it is unlikely. Therefore, joining a fraternity is not the same as choosing a side in
the fraternity conflict. You may favor your fraternity over the others, and even have
a specific “rival” fraternity, but joining one fraternity does not often imply hostility
to all other fraternities.
These arguments are even true in the case of a small town with only 2 fraternal
organizations, the Elks and the Lions. While the two clubs might compete over
the scarce resources of members or money, both presumably want the respect of
the community (not a finite good) and to raise money for charity and to promote
gentlemanly brotherhood in the town. Thus, even though both the Elks and Lions
in this case want to “win” this competition, their goals upon winning are virtually
the same. Note how this similarity contrasts with the opposing victory goals of
Democrats and Republicans.
Returning to the metaphor of sports, even being a fan of a sports team is not
quite the same as joining a political party in a two-party political system. Similar to
the Democrats and Republicans, the teams compete over scarce, excludable resources
(good players, fans, money, etc.). Moreover, there are usually rival teams, and it is
almost always better for your team to win than for your team to lose. However,
it is rare that there are only two teams in a sport, as is effectively the case with
the American two-party system. Joining the Republicans or Democrats in American
politics always means opposing all the other people who choose to identify with a
group except those in your party; being a Red Sox fan means rejecting the Yankees,
but probably has no real bearing on views of the San Diego Padres. Furthermore,
with sports teams, the ultimate goal is to win games. Once that goal is satisfied,
the competition ends until the next season. The St. Louis Cardinals won the 2011
World Series and they have won it forever, but the whole competition starts entirely
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anew in the next season. This stands in contrast to constant, never-ending party
competition and partisan policy change after winning elections.
These comparisons between political parties and other social groups provide im-
portant theoretical leverage about the nature of partisanship. They tell us that mass
partisanship in modern American politics is inherently conflict-oriented; joining the
Democrats or Republicans is equivalent to characterizing one side as good and and
the other side as bad. Conversely, since affiliating with a party means joining a con-
flict, not picking a party can be thought of as remaining neutral. This is true even
of independent leaners. Not joining a party allows them to remain socially neutral
even though they prefer one party to the other, something existing research suggests
leaners prize (Keith et al. 1992).
Thus, a close look at the nature of what it means to be partisan suggests not
only that partisanship is essentially about group identity, something which should
be strongly determined by a person’s tendency to be a joiner. It also tells us that
partisanship is inherently conflict-oriented, about picking a side and making distinc-
tions between good and bad or remaining neutral between two opposing factions.
Fortunately, existing research suggests that an individual’s proclivity toward the
conflict-oriented aspects of partisanship can also be measured.
A person’s Need to Evaluate is a psychological trait first prominently described
by Jarvis and Petty (1996). According to Nir (2011), those who have a high Need
to Evaluate have a “chronic tendency” to “form evaluative thoughts and judgments
(Jarvis and Petty 1996),” dislike remaining neutral, “would rather take a stand than
remain noncommittal,” and have strong affective intensity toward parties, candi-
dates, and objects in general (pgs. 509 - 510). Furthermore, those high in Need to
Evaluate are more likely to evaluate candidates and the Republican and Democratic
parties and liberalism and conservatism in a bipolar, or diametrically opposing way
(Federico 2007). The Need to Evaluate trait therefore captures the conflict-oriented
aspects of partisanship very well.
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Analyses using the Need to Evaluate scale have become increasingly prominent
in scholarship on political behavior, with political scientists evaluating its impact
on elite framing effects on issues (Druckman and Nelson 2003), extremity of issue
positions (Federico 2004), political participation and voter turnout (Bizer, Kros-
nick, Holbrook, Wheeler, Rucker, and Petty 2004), candidate knowledge (Holbrook
2006), understanding of liberalism and conservatism (Federico 2007), personification
of states (McGraw and Dolan 2007), ideological issue constraint (Federico and Schnei-
der 2007), attitude strength (Chong and Druckman 2010), and motivated reasoning
and citizens’ perceptions of public opinion (Nir 2011).
Despite the growing recognition of the importance of Need to Evaluate in political
science, several scholars suggest that its full potential for insight has not yet been
realized. Druckman, Kuklinski, and Sigelman (2009) note that Need to Evaluate is
one example of a concept from psychology that should be more rigorously incorpo-
rated into political science research. Similarly, Federico and Schneider (2007) point
out that the relationship between Need to Evaluate and other explanatory variables
needs to be explored further.
Since it seems strongly related to the nature of partisanship as a conflict-oriented
group identity, an individual’s Need to Evaluate should be a powerful determinant
of the strength of his or her partisanship. Like a person’s tendency to be a joiner,
the Need to Evaluate is a latent personality trait that is conceptually prior to party
identification. I expect both concepts to exert strong influence on a person’s strength
of partisanship, but the reverse is not true. It seems highly unlikely that partisanship
influences these latent personality traits. This means that Need to Evaluate can
be easily incorporated into statistical analyses of partisanship alongside important
variables suggested by existing theories, such as group affiliation.
Figure 2.1 shows the theorized cognitive relationships between Need to Evaluate
and joiner status and party ID.15 The plot depicts how Need to Evaluate and joiner
15This figure is from Mondak et al. (2010, 4) and was only slightly modified by me.
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Figure 2.1: Cognitive Relationships Between N2E, Joiner Status, & Party ID
status fit into an adapted conceptual framework developed by Mondak et al. (2010,
4) for analyzing the relationship between personality traits and political behavior.
Need to Evaluate and joiner status are personality traits like any other in Mondak et
al.’s framework. As personality traits, Need to Evaluate and joiner status are causally
influential on partisanship. They are also cognitively prior to other factors (suggested
by the triple arrows above Party ID) that influence party identification (such as
ideology, demographics, etc.). An American’s Need to Evaluate, joiner status, and
other personality traits are determined by biological/genetic factors, environmental
factors, and other mediating factors.16 In addition to their direct effects on party
ID, Need to Evaluate and joiner status may have effects on partisanship that are
16For example, individuals who are isolated from others by their environment, rather than their
own social choices, may have a strong tendency to join groups but will not have the opportunity to
do so. If so, their joiner status would be measured as low when it is actually not.
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contingent on certain environmental factors. For further details on the conceptual
research framework depicted in Figure 2.1, see Mondak et al. (2010, 3-5).
Joiners and Need to Evaluate
Federico and Schneider (2007) observe that “need to evaluate may have some
of its most important effects in interaction with other social-cognitive variables . .
. researchers have paid little attention to how the need to evaluate may interact
with other factors to influence the organization of attitude and perceptions” (243).
I expect that a person’s Need to Evaluate and tendency to be a joiner will combine
to strongly influence strength of partisanship. However, their effects will function in
different ways.
Political scientists often measure strength of partisanship in terms of a four-point
scale (the folded version of the seven-point partisanship scale). This four-point scale
runs from Pure Independent to Independent Leaner to Weak Partisan to Strong
Partisan. As a result of its strong influence on group association, I expect a person’s
joiner status to predict whether he or she identifies as a partisan or independent.
Individuals who have a weak tendency to join groups should be Pure Independents
or Independent Leaners, while those with a strong tendency to join groups should
be Weak Partisans or Strong Partisans. Due to its relationship with how likely
someone is to form positive and negative opinions and feelings about parties and
remain neutral in a conflict, I expect someone’s Need to Evaluate to predict how
strongly his or her partisanship favors one party over the other. Depending on joiner
status, those high in Need to Evaluate should be Strong Partisans or Independent
Leaners, while those low in Need to Evaluate should be Weak Partisans or Pure
Independents.
Table 2.1 shows how Need to Evaluate and joiner status combine to predict
strength of partisanship. Those low in Need to Evaluate and joiner status should be
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Pure Independents, while those high in Need to Evaluate and low in joiner status
should be Independent Leaners. Americans low in Need to Evaluate with a high
likelihood of joining groups should be Weak Partisans. Those high in both Need to
Evaluate and tendency to join groups should be Strong Partisans.
In this way, an individual’s Need to Evaluate and tendency to be a joiner should
strongly determine the nature of his or her partisanship. The combination of these
2 social-psychological factors provides even greater theoretical leverage to explain
strength of partisanship than either of these concepts alone. Their incorporation into
existing knowledge allows me to generate an understanding of the differences between
partisanship and independence that is overlooked by contemporary theories.17
Table 2.1: Two-by-Two Typology Between N2E, Joiner Status, and SPID
High Need to Evaluate Low Need to Evaluate
High Joiner Status Strong Partisan Weak Partisan
Low Joiner Status Independent Leaner Pure Independent
2.4 Designs for Assessing Theory
To assess whether an individual’s tendency to be a joiner and Need to Evaluate
have a strong impact on strength of partisanship, I take advantage of the Ameri-
can National Election Studies’ (NES) 2008-2009 Panel Study. The NES 2008-2009
Panel Study includes the questions necessary to measure Need to Evaluate (see Bizer
et al. 2004), joiner status (as measured in Baldassarri 2011), ideology, party ID
and strength of party ID (measured to include strong/weak partisans, independent
leaners, and pure independents), and standard demographic controls (race, income,
17I have no expectations that Need to Evaluate and joiner status will influence party direction, as
opposed to party strength. I re-examine the findings of Bizer et al. (2004) by analyzing the effects
of Need to Evaluate and joiner status on whether a person identifies as a Republican, and find no
evidence they influence party direction.
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education, religion, religiosity, marital status, age, region, and gender). I test the
following hypotheses, which directly follow from the conflict-oriented, group identity
theory of partisanship:
• Hypothesis 1: An individual’s Need to Evaluate and joiner status
have a strong effect on partisanship, such that:
– Hypothesis 1A: Americans with a higher Need to Evaluate have
greater strength of partisanship.
– Hypothesis 1B: Americans with a higher tendency to be a joiner
have greater strength of partisanship.
• Hypothesis 2: Need to Evaluate and joiner status significantly ex-
plain the difference between different levels of strength of partisan-
ship, such that:
– Hypothesis 2A: Need to Evaluate significantly distinguishes be-
tween pure independents (lower Need to Evaluate) and leaners
(higher).
– Hypothesis 2B: Need to Evaluate significantly distinguishes be-
tween weak partisans (lower Need to Evaluate) and strong par-
tisans (higher).
– Hypothesis 2C: Joiner status significantly distinguishes between
pure independents (lower joiner status) and weak partisans (higher).
– Hypothesis 2D: Joiner status significantly distinguishes between
leaners (lower joiner status) and strong partisans (higher).
• Hypothesis 3: Need to Evaluate and joiner status interact to influ-
ence an individual’s strength of partisanship according to the typolo-
gies depicted in Table 2.1.
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– Hypothesis 3A: All else equal, individuals with a high joiner
status and high Need to Evaluate are more likely to be strong
partisans.
– Hypothesis 3B: All else equal, individuals with a high joiner
status and low Need to Evaluate are more likely to be weak
partisans.
– Hypothesis 3C: All else equal, individuals with a low joiner sta-
tus and high Need to Evaluate are more likely to be independent
leaners.
– Hypothesis 3D: All else equal, individuals with a low joiner sta-
tus and low Need to Evaluate are more likely to be pure inde-
pendents.
After testing these hypotheses and showing strong support for them, I provide
additional findings as theory robustness checks in Appendix A. I show that, as re-
ported in previous research and assumed by my theory, individuals with higher Need
to Evaluate are significantly less ambivalent in their evaluations of the Democratic
and Republican parties. I also demonstrate that an American’s Need to Evaluate is
not the same as his or her level of political sophistication.
2.5 Data and Results
Need to Evaluate, Joiner Status, and Effects on Strength of Partisanship
To test Hypotheses 1A and 1B, I run an ordered probit of folded strength of
partisanship on Need to Evaluate, tendency to be a joiner, race, income, educa-
tion, religion, religiosity, marital status, age, region, and gender. As is common
on academic surveys, the NES 2008-2009 Panel Study measures partisanship on a
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seven-point scale, from Strong Democrat to Weak Democrat to Independent Lean
Democrat to Pure Independent to Independent Lean Republican to Weak Republican
to Strong Republican. Folding this scale, I obtain a 4-point strength of partisanship
scale that runs from Pure Independent to Independent Lean Republican/Democrat
to Weak Republican/Democrat to Strong Republican/Democrat.
The NES 2008-2009 Panel Study measures Need to Evaluate robustly using just
two questions.18 The first question is: “Some people have opinions about almost
everything; other people have opinions about just some things; and still other people
have very few opinions. What about you? Would you say you have opinions about
almost everything, about many things, about some things, or about very few things?”
Following Bizer et al. (2004, 1005), I coded responses of “almost everything” as
1, “many things” as .66, “some things” as .33, and “very few things” as 0. The
second question is: “Compared to the average person do you have fewer opinions
about whether things are good or bad, about the same number of opinions, or more
opinions? Would you say that you have a lot fewer opinions or just somewhat fewer
opinions? Would you say that you have a lot more opinions or just somewhat more
opinions?” Again following Bizer et al. (2004, 1005), I coded responses of “a lot
more opinions” as 1, “somewhat more opinions” as .75, “about the same number of
opinions” as .5, “somewhat fewer opinions” as .25, and “a lot fewer opinions” as 0.
I then averaged the scores from each question to yield an semi-continuous scale that
runs from 0 (lowest Need to Evaluate) to 1 (highest Need to Evaluate).
A person’s joiner status is measured by examining the number of organizations
to which respondents to the 2008-2009 NES Panel Study said that they “currently
belong.” The organizations that individuals could say that they currently belonged
to included advocacy groups, amateur athletic organizations, arts associations, book
reading clubs, business clubs, charitable organizations, churches and other houses
of worship, religious clubs or groups, college or university-based clubs, Greek or-
18See Bizer et al. 2004 for additional details on the measurement of Need to Evaluate.
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ganizations, civic clubs, country clubs, fraternal orders, health clubs, local/district
improvement organizations, political groups other than parties, social clubs, veter-
ans clubs, and others. Following the coding in Baldassarri 2011 (19), tendency to
be a joiner is coded as an ordinal scale ranging from 0 (member of no groups) to 1
(member of one group) to 2 (member of two or more groups).
A dummy variable measuring whether respondents identify as black is included,
with the variable “Black” taking a value of 1 if the respondent identifies as black
and 0 otherwise. Respondent income is coded as ordinal scale, ranging from 1 (re-
spondent earns less than $5,000 dollars a year) to 19 (respondent earns more than
$175,000 dollars a year). Education is also coded as an ordinal scale, ranging from
1 (respondent lacks a high school diploma) to 5 (respondent holds a graduate de-
gree). I also include a dummy variable that measures if the respondent identifies
as Catholic, such that “Catholic” takes a value of 1 if the respondent identifies as
Catholic and 0 otherwise. Religiosity is a continuous variable that measures how
many days per year the respondent reports attending religious services, not includ-
ing weddings or funerals, and ranges from 0 days per year to over 300. I also include
a dummy variable measuring a respondent’s marital status in my analysis; Married
takes a value of 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise. Age is coded as
a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to 90 years. To account for the unique
character of the South, I include a dummy variable (South) that measures whether
a respondent lives in the South. South takes a value of 1 if the respondent lives in
one of the states that fought for the Confederacy, and 0 otherwise. I also include a
dummy variable measuring a respondent’s gender in my analysis; Male takes a value
of 1 for men and 0 for women.
The results of my ordered probit analysis, regressing folded strength of parti-
sanship on Need to Evaluate, joiner status, and a variety of controls, are depicted
in Table 2.2. These results strongly support Hypotheses 1A and 1B. An Ameri-
can’s Need to Evaluate and tendency to join groups have strong effects on his or her
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strength of partisanship, such that those with higher Need to Evaluate or tendency
to join groups have greater strength of partisanship. Both of these effects are statis-
tically significant at a .05 level, and are also highly substantively significant as well.
Table 2.3 shows that these results hold when respondents are looked at separately by
partisanship.19 Need to Evaluate and joiner status have similarly strong effects on
strength of partisanship for strong Democrats, weak Democrats, Democratic leaners,
and pure independents only, and strong Republicans, weak Republicans, Republican
leaners, and pure independents only, though some of the effects of other explanatory
variables differ by partisanship.
Table 2.2: Ordered Probit of SPID on N2E and Joiner Status
Estimate Std. Error
Need to Evaluate .83* .18
Joiner Status .11* .05
Male -.20* .07
Age .00 .00
Education .10* .04
Income -.01 .01
Black .40* .15
Religiosity .00 .00
Catholic .02 .09
South -.01 .08
Married .12 .08
Tau1 -.29 .21
Tau2 .39# .21
Tau3 1.09* .21
Residual deviance = 2522.253
N of sample = 1018
AIC = 2550.253
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
19The effects of personality traits on political attitudes and behavior can vary by party ID. See
Table 5 of Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013 for one example.
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Table 2.3: Ordered Probit of SPID on N2E & Joiner Status for Partisans
GOP + Indies Only Democrats + Indies Only
Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
Need to Evaluate .88* (.24) .92* (.24)
Joiner Status .14* (.06) .13* (.06)
Male -.16 (.10) -.17# (.10)
Age -.00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Education .10* (.05) .16* (.05)
Income .01 (.02) -.02# (.01)
Black -1.38* (.36) .74* (.17)
Religiosity .00* (.00) -.00* (.00)
Catholic .11 (.12) -.02 (.11)
South .09 (.11) -.09 (.12)
Married .35* (.12) .02 (.10)
Tau1 .43 (.30) .19 (.27)
Tau2 .97* (.30) .69* (.27)
Tau3 1.64* (.30) 1.29* (.28)
Residual Deviance 1395.80 1472.73
N of sample 547 589
AIC 1423.80 1500.73
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
Figure 2.2 shows how the predicted probabilities of being a pure independent
or strong partisan change as a profile respondent’s Need to Evaluate increases, all
else equal. This profile respondent is the typical “median” respondent, and has her
characteristics set at the sample median for all explanatory variables, except when
Need to Evaluate and joiner status are allowed to vary. She is 51 years old, has some
college education but no bachelor’s degree, earns $60,000 to $74,999 per year, does
not identify as black, is married and attends religious services 8 times per year, is
not Catholic, does not live in the South, belongs to one group, and has a Need to
Evaluate (.58) slightly above the scale midpoint (.5).
This median respondent’s probability of being a pure independent is about 10%,
and her probability of being a strong partisan is about 45%. All else equal, if her
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Figure 2.2: Probability of SPID as N2E Varies for the Median Respondent
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Need to Evaluate decreases to the minimum amount (0), her probability of identi-
fying as a pure independent increases to approximately 22% and her probability of
identifying as a strong partisan decreases to roughly 27%. If the profile respondent’s
Need to Evaluate increases to its highest amount (1), her probability of being a pure
independent shrinks to only 5%, and her probability of being a strong partisan in-
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creases to a whopping 59%. These are huge effects, and show that Need to Evaluate
is a strong determinant of partisanship. Moving from a very low Need to Evaluate
to a very high one doubles the median respondent’s probability of being a strong
partisan, and quarters her probability of being a pure independent.
Joiner status also has a big effect on the median respondent’s strength of parti-
sanship, which is depicted in Figure 2.3. All else equal, if her tendency to join groups
changes from its lowest level (0) to its highest level (2), her probability of identifying
as a pure independent decreases from roughly 13% to about 9%. Her probability of
identifying as a strong partisan increases from about 40% to roughly 49%. These
are large effects, and show that tendency to join groups is also a strong determinant
of partisanship. Moving from a low joiner status to a high one makes the median
respondent about 25% less likely to be a pure independent, and roughly 25% more
likely to be a strong partisan.
Distinguishing Between Levels of Strength of Partisanship
Having demonstrated strong support for Hypotheses 1A-B, I now turn to testing
Hypotheses 2A - 2D. Collectively, these hypotheses reflect the specific predictions of
my theory about the effects of an American’s tendency to join groups and Need to
Evaluate on explaining the difference between different levels of strength of parti-
sanship. Support for each of them individually provides evidence in favor of general
Hypothesis 2. To test Hypotheses 2A - 2D, I use the same NES 2008-2009 Panel
Study data that I used to test Hypotheses 1A-B and perform similar analyses that
focus on only 2 categories of the folded strength of party ID scale at a time. For
example, to determine whether Need to Evaluate significantly distinguishes between
pure independents and leaners (Hypothesis 2A), I run a logit of leaner (1) or pure
independent (0) SPID on Need to Evaluate, tendency to be a joiner, race, income,
education, religion, religiosity, marital status, age, region, and gender for all respon-
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Figure 2.3: Probability of SPID as Joiner Status Varies for Median Respondent
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dents. I run similar logits for strong partisan (1) or weak partisan (0) SPID, weak
partisan (1) or pure independent (0) SPID, and strong partisan (1) or independent
leaner (0) SPID.
In addition, I run these logits separately for Democrats/Democratic leaners/pure
independents and Republicans/Republican leaners/pure independents. This allows
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me to examine how direction of partisanship and partisan differences affect these
results, since the effects of personality traits on political attitudes and behavior can
vary by party ID. My results in Table 2.4 provide mostly strong evidence for general
Hypothesis 2.20
Table 2.4: Logits of 2 SPID Categories on N2E, Joiner Status, & Controls
Leaner or Strong or Weak Partisan or Strong Partisan or
Pure Indie Weak Partisan Pure Indie Leaner
Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
N2E (All) 1.39* (.61) 2.28* (.44) .45 (.60) .83# (.44)
N2E (GOP+Indies) 1.96* (.78) 2.45* (.65) .48 (.69) .26 (.66)
N2E (Dems+Indies) .68 (.76) 2.11* (.62) .48 (.70) 1.21# (.63)
Joiner (All) .38* (.17) .24* (.11) .17 (.16) -.01 (.12)
Joiner (GOP+Indies) .48* (.21) .51* (.16) -.07 (.18) -.09 (.18)
Joiner (Dems+Indies) .22 (.20) -.02 (.16) .34# (.19) .08 (.17)
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
Not only do the results in Table 2.4 strongly support Hypothesis 2A-C, but they
also argue persuasively in favor of the idea that partisanship is a conflict-oriented
group identity, and one that should examined by strength and direction of partisan-
ship.
As predicted by Hypothesis 2A, an American’s Need to Evaluate strongly dis-
criminates between whether he or she identifies as an independent leaner or pure
independent, with those higher in Need to Evaluate more likely to be leaners. This
finding holds for both all respondents, and Republicans, Republican leaners, and
pure independents alone. Interestingly, an American’s tendency to be a joiner has
the same effect and for the same groups of respondents, with joiners more signifi-
cantly more likely to be leaners than pure independents. While my theory makes
no explicit predictions about joiner status discriminating between the two kinds of
independents, this finding underscores the importance of joiner status. It also pro-
20Full results with controls available upon request from the author.
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vides additional support for the theory that partisanship is a conflict-oriented group
identity.
Table 2.4 also shows strong support for Hypothesis 2B. Need to Evaluate sig-
nificantly distinguishes between strong partisans and weak partisans; those higher
in Need to Evaluate are more likely to be strong partisans. This is true for all re-
spondents and both partisan groups of respondents. Additionally, an American’s
tendency to join groups also has this effect for all respondents, and Republicans,
Republican leaners, and pure independents. Individuals with higher joiner status
are more likely to be strong partisans than weak partisans.
Hypothesis 2C is also supported in Table 2.4. An individual’s joiner status sig-
nificantly determines whether he or she is a weak partisan or pure independent, with
those more likely to join groups more likely to be weak partisans. These results hold
for Democrats, Democratic leaners, and pure independents alone, underscoring the
importance of taking into account direction of partisanship when analyzing strength
of partisanship.
Hypothesis 2D is only the component of general Hypothesis 2 that is not con-
firmed in Table 2.4. Joiner status has no statistically significant effect that distin-
guishes between leaners and strong partisans, for all respondents or either partisan
group of respondents. However, although this specific prediction of my theory is not
born out here, the components of the theory still discriminate between strong parti-
sans and independent leaners. Need to Evaluate significantly distinguishes between
strong partisans and leaners for all respondents, and Republicans, Republican lean-
ers, and pure independents. Americans higher in Need to Evaluate are more likely
to be strong partisans than independent leaners. Thus, Hypothesis 2 has consider-
able support. Table 2.4 shows that joiner status and Need to Evaluate can strongly
discriminate between strength of partisanship categories; the conflict-oriented group
identity theory of partisanship is very powerful.
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Need to Evaluate, Joiner Status, and Typology Effects on Strength of Partisan-
ship
Having shown that Need to Evaluate and joiner status strongly explain the differ-
ence between levels of strength of partisanship in theoretically expected directions,
I now turn to a stronger test of my theory. I show that joiner status and Need to
Evaluate predict strength of partisanship according to the 2 by 2 typology depicted
in Table 2.1, and demonstrate strong support for general Hypothesis 3.
In order to test Hypotheses 3A-3D, I assign cutpoints for “High” and “Low”
joiner status and Need to Evaluate, and then create dummy variables representing
the intersection of each pair. Individuals who are “High” in Need to Evaluate are
those in roughly the top third of the sample in Need to Evaluate, and individuals who
are “Low” in Need to Evaluate are approximately those in bottom third. Individuals
who are “High” in joiner status are those who belong to three or more groups, and
individuals who are “Low” in joiner status are those who belong to one group or
no groups. This coding allows empirical representation of the Table 2.1’s four types
with sufficient sample sizes for analysis.21
After creating dummy variables representing each of the four types of Americans
in Table 2.1 (High Need to Evaluate/High Joiner Status, High Need to Evaluate/Low
Joiner Status, Low Need to Evaluate/Low Joiner Status, and Low Need to Evalu-
ate/High Joiner Status), I run logits of each of the four strength of partisanship
categories on its theoretically influential Need to Evaluate/joiner status intersection
dummy and controls.22 Coefficient and standard error estimates are bootstrapped to
increase their reliability. Once again, I examine these results for all respondents, and
for strong and weak Democrats/Democratic leaners/pure independents, and strong
21Further details of this typology coding are available upon request from the author. Any typology
coding is to some degree arbitrary, and empirically faces a trade-off between conceptual specificity
and sample size.
22The controls I use here are the same ones used in the rest of my analysis: Gender, age, education,
income, black ID, religiosity, Catholic ID, Southern residence, and marital status.
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and weak Republicans/Republican leaners/pure independents separately. Table 2.5
shows the results, which strongly support Hypotheses 3A-3D.
Confirming Hypothesis 3A, Americans who are high in Need to Evaluate and
joiner status are significantly more likely to be strong partisans, all else equal. This
relationship holds for all respondents, and both partisan groups. Table 2.5 also shows
evidence supporting Hypothesis 3B, though only for strong and weak Republicans,
Republican leaners, and pure independents; those high in joiner status but low in
Need to Evaluate are more likely to be weak partisans.
I also corroborate Hypothesis 3C. Among all respondents, and strong and weak
Republicans, Republican leaners, and pure independents, those high in Need to Eval-
uate but low in joiner status have a significantly greater likelihood of being indepen-
dent leaners. Furthermore, Table 2.5 demonstrates that those with low joiner status
and low Need to Evaluate are much more likely to be pure independents, for all re-
spondents and for both partisan groups. This evidence strong supports Hypothesis
3D. Having found empirical support for Hypotheses 3A-3D, my analysis substantially
verifies general Hypothesis 3.
It’s not clear why the dynamics in Hypotheses 3A-3D should hold more powerfully
for the Republican group than the Democratic one. This may be due to unique
characteristics of the sample, or some other factor may be at work. Nevertheless,
Table 2.5 shows that my theory significantly explains strength of partisanship.
The significant effects presented in Table 2.5 are substantial. Among all respon-
dents, the sample’s median respondent is about 17 percentage points more likely to
be a strong partisan if she is high in both Need to Evaluate and joiner status.23
For strong and weak Republicans, Republican leaners, and pure independents, the
median respondent is about 5 percentage points more likely to be a leaner if she is
high in Need to Evaluate and low in joiner status, and approximately 12 percentage
points more likely to be a weak partisan if she is low in Need to Evaluate and high
23The demographic profile of this respondent is discussed previously.
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Table 2.5: Logits of SPID Categories on Need to Typology Dummies
Strong Weak Independent Pure
Partisan Partisan Leaner Independent
Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
High N2E/High Joiner (All) .68* (.24) - - -
Low N2E/High Joiner (All) - .11 (.31) - -
High N2E/Low Joiner (All) - - .36# (.22) -
Low N2E/Low Joiner (All) - - - .76* (.23)
High N2E/High Joiner (GOP+Indies) .81* (.35) - - -
Low N2E/High Joiner (GOP+Indies) - .54# (.33) - -
High N2E/Low Joiner (GOP+Indies) - - .43# (.27) -
Low N2E/Low Joiner (GOP+Indies) - - - .90* (.24)
High N2E/High Joiner (Dems+Indies) .51# (.31) - - -
Low N2E/High Joiner (Dems+Indies) - -.78 (.66) - -
High N2E/Low Joiner (Dems+Indies) - - .27 (.31) -
Low N2E/Low Joiner (Dems+Indies) - - - .62* (.27)
N (All) 1018 1018 1018 1018
N (GOP+Indies) 547 547 547 547
N (Dems+Indies) 589 589 589 589
# indicates p < .1 after rounding
* indicates p < .05 after rounding
Estimates are bootstrapped, B=250
Control variables not shown
Full results available upon request
in joiner status. Among strong and weak Democrats, Democratic leaners, and pure
independents, the median respondent is roughly 11 percentage points more likely to
be pure independent if she is low in Need to Evaluate and joiner status. These strong
substantive effects also provide supporting evidence for general Hypothesis 3.
2.6 Conclusion
I have demonstrated considerable support for general Hypotheses 1-3. The results
of these analyses corroborate my conflict-oriented, group-identity theory of partisan-
ship. While rational choice and social identity theories provide important insight
on the direction of party identification, a complete understanding of partisanship,
particularly strength of partisanship, requires analyzing Need to Evaluate and joiner
status.
Americans perceive their parties as a part of themselves, and to be partisan
they must be willing to embrace the identification of joining a group of “people like
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me” or even join a group at all. They must be willing to accept distinctions between
themselves and others, and their team and the opposing. Therefore, the role of joiner
status to some degree fits with social identity explanations of partisanship. However,
to join a party Americans must also be able to see distinction between themselves and
others, to take stands on issue positions and evaluate their beliefs and those of others
in a dualistic way. Need to Evaluate is a source of those preferences and distinctions.
The role of Need to Evaluate is complementary to rationalist, ideology-based theories
of partisanship; it supports the idea that preferences are important by arguing for
the relevance of the sources of those preferences. Thus, Need to Evaluate, joiner
status, and my conflict-oriented, group-identity theory of partisanship help reconcile
existing theories and also build upon them.
These two social-psychological characteristics strongly influence strength of par-
tisanship for independents and individuals of both parties. Furthermore, they effec-
tively discriminate between levels of the under-studied strength-of-partisanship scale,
something existing theories are unable to do. Americans can be effectively classified
on the basis of their joiner status and Need to Evaluate into four types; these types
correspond with the four categories of folded strength of partisanship and explain
them surprisingly well.
The conceptual and empirical power of the conflict-oriented, group identity theory
of partisanship rests on just two personality traits. Political behavior scholars have
begun taking advantage of personality to generate insightful research (e.g., Mondak
2010), and the conclusions presented here suggest that we should do so even more.
Since genetics determines personality to some degree, political scientists should ana-
lyze genetics and personality together going forward, at least to the extent that this
is possible without compromising theory. My future work will build on this idea and
examine whether Need to Evaluate and joiner status can explain observed gender
differences in partisanship.
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III CONFLICT, GROUPS, AND THE GENDER GAP IN STRENGTH OF
PARTISANSHIP
3.1 Introduction & Research Question
Scholars of partisanship and elections have focused much attention on “gaps”
in party ID and voting among a variety of American demographics in recent years
(Olson and Green 2006), including the religion gap, age gap, and gender gap. The
gender gap in particular has been found to be robust and multifaceted. Scholars have
found persistent differences between men and women in Democratic identification
(Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004), Policy Mood (Kellstedt, Peterson, and
Ramirez 2010), and social welfare views (Kauffman and Petrocik 1999).
Many of the broad conclusions of political science research on the gender gap
are widely known and have even been absorbed and transmitted by the popular
press. However, there is an important aspect of the gender gap that is sometimes
overlooked: Strength of partisanship.
Political scientists have known of a persistent gender gap in strength of partisan-
ship since Norrander (1997), though scholars have been aware of it in various forms
for decades (Norrander 1999). Norrander (1997) pointed out robust differences be-
tween men and women in strength of partisanship, with men more likely to identify
as independent leaners (or “leaners”) and women more likely to identify as weak
partisans. After demonstrating that these gaps had persisted over time and were not
simply an artifact of demographic differences, Norrander suggested that the gaps
might be due to women’s greater affinity for embracing others and groups or gender-
based variation in psychological traits. However, she was unable to thoroughly test
these explanations due to lack of available data.
I demonstrate that Norrander’s broad findings on the gender gap in strength
of partisanship still hold. Women are still more likely to be weak partisans than
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men, and men are still more likely to be leaners than women. I then apply the
conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship (see Ferguson 2013) to explain
these differences. As Norrander suggested, women have a higher latent tendency to
join groups than men, and this contributes to observed differences in strength of
partisanship between men and women. Additionally, men are higher in a personality
trait called Need to Evaluate, and this also contributes to the gender gap. I analyze
how important Need to Evaluate and joiner status are for the gender gap in strength
of partisanship separately for men and women, and show that they are important
for both genders and that they significantly contribute to the gender gap in strength
of partisanship.
3.2 Literature Review
Women are more likely than men to identify as Democrats (Box-Steffensmeier,
De Boef, and Lin 2004), have more liberal Policy Mood than men (Kellstedt, Peter-
son, and Ramirez 2010), and have more liberal views on issues such as education,
healthcare, social welfare, and defense (Conover 1988, Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).
Scholars have provided some explanations for these differences, including women be-
ing more economically vulnerable in the past (Carroll 1988, Kellstedt, Peterson, and
Ramirez 2010). Other explanations include variation in the percent of poor, single
women in the American public (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004), women’s
greater empathy than men (Gault and Sabini 2000, Brooks and Valentino 2011), and
genetic factors (Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves 2009). Women may base their ideolog-
ical identification on different issues than men as well (Norrander and Wilcox 2008).
Men are also somewhat more interested in and informed about politics (Mondak and
Anderson 2004), though it’s not clear how this relates to these aspects of the gender
gap. Importantly, women’s greater liberalism and identification with the Democratic
Party are not caused by abortion or women’s equality issues (Kauffman, Petrocik,
and Shaw 2008).
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In contrast to the more well-known aspects of the gender gap, political scientists
have not discovered the causes of women’s greater propensity to identify as weak
partisans and men’s greater affinity for being independent leaners. Norrander (1997)
finds that neither ideological proximity nor standard demographic differences be-
tween men and women are responsible for these differences. It is also not the case
that women have more things they like about the political parties (Norrander 1997).
Norrander asks: “Does the independence gap stem from a more general differ-
ence in the manner in which men and women view the political world? Gilligan
(1982) suggests that socialization leads men to value separateness and women to
value connections with others. Men’s preference for separateness might be expressed
in political independence, while women’s sense of belonging might lead them to parti-
sanship” (1997, 471-472). However, she can’t directly test these ideas, and is unable
to provide an explanation for men’s greater identification as leaners and women’s
greater identification as weak partisans.
Political scientists have had difficulty explaining the distinctions between inde-
pendent leaners and weak partisans generally. Perhaps the most prominent work on
leaners, Keith et al. 1992, primarily concludes that leaners are very similar to weak
partisans. Until recently, behavior scholars lacked even a general theory of strength
of partisanship, commonly measured on academic surveys as an ordinal scale that
runs from Pure Independent to Independent Leaner to Weak Partisan to Strong Par-
tisan. Without an understanding of what it means to be an independent leaner or
a weak partisan, and the difference between them, explaining why men more often
choose one and women more often choose the other is naturally challenging.
Fortunately, Ferguson (2013) lays out a theory of strength of partisanship that
elucidates the distinction between independent leaners and weak partisans. His
conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship takes advantage of two per-
sonality traits, an individual’s Need to Evaluate and joiner status. Described first
by Jarvis and Petty (1996), people high in Need to Evaluate don’t like remaining
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neutral in conflicts, have a “chronic tendency” to “form evaluative thoughts and
judgments (Jarvis and Petty 1996),” and tend to strongly like or dislike parties and
candidates (Nir 2011, pgs. 509 - 510). Joiner status refers an individual’s latent
tendency to join groups, which varies widely in the American public (see Putnam
2001 and Baldassarri 2011).
Ferguson (2013) shows that Need to Evaluate and joiner status significantly affect
an American’s strength of partisanship and distinguish between levels of the four-
point strength of partisanship scale. Independent leaners are those who have low
joiner status and don’t join the partisan “team,” but have high Need to Evaluate and
favor one party over the other. Weak partisans are those who have high joiner status
and have joined the party, but have low Need to Evaluate and don’t strongly favor
one party over the other. These differences are visualized in Table 3.1, replicated
here from Ferguson (2013, where it appears as Table 2.1).
Table 3.1: Two-by-Two Typology for SPID, N2E, & Joiner Status
High Need to Evaluate Low Need to Evaluate
High Joiner Status Strong Partisan Weak Partisan
Low Joiner Status Independent Leaner Pure Independent
As depicted in Table 3.1, joiner status distinguishes between pure independents
and weak partisans, and between leaners and strong partisans, depending on their
Need to Evaluate. Need to Evaluate distinguishes between pure independents and
leaners, and between weak and strong partisans, depending on their joiner status.
This theory allow us understand the distinctions between independent leaners and
weak partisans. I now turn to applying Ferguson’s conflict-oriented, group identity
theory of partisanship to explain differences in strength of partisanship between men
and women.
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3.3 Theory
In order for the conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship to explain
why men are more likely to identify as leaners and women are more likely to identify
as weak partisans, there must be gender differences relating to one or both of the
theory’s two key variables, joiner status and Need to Evaluate. One should expect
this to be the case. Norrander (1997) suggests that there might be psychological
“difference in the manner in which men and women view the political world” (471).
Indeed, her discussion of male “preference for separateness” and female “sense of
belonging” and “connections with others” seems to imply an inherent difference in
joiner status between men and women, with women having higher joiner status than
men.
One should also expect there to be significant differences between men and women
in Need to Evaluate. In a pilot study of the 1998 American National Election Study,
Bizer, Krosnick, Petty, Rucker, and Wheeler (2000, 41) demonstrate that men have
higher Need to Evaluate than women (see Bizer et al.’s Table 3), though they do not
provide a thorough explanation of this finding. Bizer, Krosnick, Holbrook, Wheeler,
Rucker, and Petty (2004) provide additional evidence that men are higher in Need
to Evaluate than women, although once again without summarizing why this might
be the case. This may simply be an example of a “difference in the manner in which
men and women view the political world” (Norrander 1997, 471). Regardless, we
should expect men to be higher in Need to Evaluate than women.
If women are higher in joiner status than men, and men are higher in Need
to Evaluate than women, Ferguson’s (2013) conflict-oriented, group identity theory
of partisanship should lead us to expect that men will favor different strengths of
partisanship than women. Americans low(er) in joiner status and high(er) in Need to
Evaluate are more likely to be independent leaners, and Americans high(er) in joiner
status and low(er) in Need to Evaluate are more likely to be weak partisans (refer
to Table 3.1, and see Ferguson 2013); we should expect more men to be leaners and
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more women to weak partisans. Therefore, since the theory’s two key explanatory
factors vary between men and women in theoretically important and expected ways,
we should expect that the conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship
should explain in part why men are more likely to be leaners and women are more
likely to be weak partisans. In the rest of this paper, I show that this in fact true.
3.4 Designs for Assessing Theory
In order to demonstrate that the conflict-oriented, group identity theory of parti-
sanship explains why women have a greater propensity to identify as weak partisans
and men have a greater tendency to identify as independent leaners, I take advantage
of the American National Election Studies’ (NES) 2008-2009 Panel Study. The NES
2008-2009 Panel Study measures joiner status and Need to Evaluate (see Baldassarri
2011, Bizer et al. 2004, and Ferguson 2013), along with strength of partisanship
(measured to include strong/weak partisans, independent leaners, and pure indepen-
dents) and the usual demographics. This makes the NES 2008-2009 Panel Study
ideal and unique.
First, I show that Norrander’s (1997) findings on the gender gap in strength of
partisanship continue to hold: Women are more likely to identify as weak partisans
than men, and men are more likely to identify as leaners than women. Second, I
show that as expected, women are significantly higher in joiner status than men, and
men are significantly higher in Need to Evaluate than women. After demonstrating
the expected differences in strength of partisanship, Need to Evaluate, and joiner
status between men and women, I then turn to providing evidence that the conflict-
oriented, group identity theory of partisanship explains much of the gender gap in
strength of partisanship.
To do this, I demonstrate that Need to Evaluate and joiner status significantly
discriminate between different levels of strength of partisanship in generally the same
ways for men and women. Need to Evaluate discriminates between leaners and pure
40
independents for men by themselves and women by themselves, and between weak
partisans and strong partisans for men by themselves and women by themselves.
Joiner status discriminates between weak partisans and pure independents for men
alone and women alone, and between leaners and strong partisans for women alone.
Specifically, I test the following general and specific hypotheses, which follow from
the conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship and discussion above:
• Hypothesis 4: Men are more likely to be leaners because of their
higher Need to Evaluate and/or lower joiner status.
– Hypothesis 4A: Men are more likely to be leaners because their
higher Need to Evaluate leads them to more often be leaners
instead of pure independents than they otherwise would.
– Hypothesis 4B: Men are more likely to be leaners because their
lower joiner status causes them to more often be leaners instead
of strong partisans than they otherwise would.
• Hypothesis 5: Women are less likely to be leaners because of their
lower Need to Evaluate and/or higher joiner status.
– Hypothesis 5A: Women are less likely to be leaners because their
lower Need to Evaluate leads them to more often be pure inde-
pendents instead of leaners than they otherwise would.
– Hypothesis 5B: Women are less likely to be leaners because their
higher joiner status causes them to more often be strong parti-
sans instead of leaners than they otherwise would.
• Hypothesis 6: Men are less likely to be weak partisans because of
their higher Need to Evaluate and/or lower joiner status.
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– Hypothesis 6A: Men are less likely to be weak partisans because
their higher Need to Evaluate leads them to more often be strong
partisans instead of weak partisans than they otherwise would.
– Hypothesis 6B: Men are less likely to be weak partisans because
their lower joiner status causes them to more often be pure inde-
pendents instead of weak partisans than they otherwise would.
• Hypothesis 7: Women are more likely to be weak partisans because
of their lower Need to Evaluate and/or higher joiner status.
– Hypothesis 7A: Women are more likely to be weak partisans be-
cause their lower Need to Evaluate leads them to more often be
weak partisans instead of strong partisans than they otherwise
would.
– Hypothesis 7B: Women are more likely to be weak partisans
because their higher joiner status causes them to more often be
weak partisans instead of pure independents than they otherwise
would.
I find support for general Hypotheses 4-7. These results show that Need to
Evaluate and joiner status influence men and women’s choice between identifying as
leaners or pure independents and strong partisans, and between identifying as weak
partisans or pure independents and strong partisans. This provides evidence that
the causal mechanisms relating Need to Evaluate and joiner status to strength of
partisanship are more or less the same for men and women.
I then analyze how much men and women’s different levels of joiner status and
Need to Evaluate lead them to choose differently between leaners or weak partisans,
and other strengths of partisanship, for a profile median respondent. The results
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provide some indication of how much of the observed gender gap in strength of par-
tisanship is caused by gender differences in Need to Evaluate and joiner status. I find
that these two traits, and the conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship,
are responsible for a considerable part of the gender gap in strength of partisanship.
I then conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for future research.
3.5 Data and Results
To demonstrate the distinctions between women and men in strength of partisan-
ship, and show that differences between women and men in Need to Evaluate and
joiner status are partly responsible for these distinctions, I use data from the NES’
2008-2009 Panel Study. The Study measures partisanship using the familiar seven-
point scale found on most academic surveys, which runs from Strong Democrat to
Weak Democrat to Independent Lean Democrat to Pure Independent to Independent
Lean Republican to Weak Republican to Strong Republican. Folding this seven-point
scale allows me to measure strength of partisanship in a party-neutral way, so that
it runs from Pure Independent to Independent Leaner to Weak Partisan to Strong
Partisan.
Need to Evaluate is measured robustly with two questions (see Bizer et al. 2004).
One question asks: “Some people have opinions about almost everything; other
people have opinions about just some things; and still other people have very few
opinions. What about you? Would you say you have opinions about almost every-
thing, about many things, about some things, or about very few things?” Mirroring
Ferguson (2013) and Bizer et al. (2004, 1005), I code responses of “almost every-
thing” as 1, “many things” as .66, “some things” as .33, and “very few things” as
0. The next question asks: “Compared to the average person do you have fewer
opinions about whether things are good or bad, about the same number of opin-
ions, or more opinions? Would you say that you have a lot fewer opinions or just
somewhat fewer opinions? Would you say that you have a lot more opinions or just
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somewhat more opinions?” Again mirroring Ferguson (2013) and Bizer et al. (2004,
1005), I code responses of “a lot more opinions” as 1, “somewhat more opinions” as
.75, “about the same number of opinions” as .5, “somewhat fewer opinions” as .25,
and “a lot fewer opinions” as 0. I take the mean of the scores from each question to
create a scale that runs from 0 (minimum Need to Evaluate) to 1 (maximum Need
to Evaluate).
I measure an American’s joiner status by adding up the number of organizations
to which respondents said that they “currently belong.” Organizations that peo-
ple could say that they currently belonged to include: Amateur athletic organiza-
tions, arts associations, book reading clubs, business clubs, charitable organizations,
churches and other houses of worship, religious clubs or groups, college or university-
based clubs, Greek organizations, civic clubs, country clubs, advocacy groups, frater-
nal orders, health clubs, local/district improvement organizations, political groups
other than parties, social clubs, veterans clubs, and a few more. I follow Baldassarri
2011 (19), and code joiner status as an ordinal scale that ranges from 0 (member of
zero groups) to 1 (member of one group) to 2 (member of two or more groups). My
analysis also includes several control variables. The variable “Black” takes a value
of 1 if the respondent identifies as black and 0 otherwise. High School Graduate is
a dummy variable that is a 1 if the respondent has graduated from high school and
a 0 otherwise. Catholic takes a value of 1 if the respondent identifies as Catholic
and 0 otherwise. Married is a dummy variable that I code as 1 if the respondent is
married and 0 otherwise. I code Age as a continuous variable that ranges from 18 to
90 years.
Having explained the data I use, I now turn to my analysis. Table 3.2 shows
the differences in strength of partisanship between men and women. Using the NES
cumulative file, 1952-1994, Norrander (1997, 469) found that women were on average
5 percentage points less likely to identify as leaners than men and 5 percentage points
more likely to identify as weak partisans than men. In contrast, Norrander found
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that differences between men and women in pure independent and strong partisan
identification were minimal. Table 3.2 presents Norrander’s findings alongside mine
from the NES’ 2008-2009 Panel Study.
Table 3.2: Differences Between Men and Women in Strength of Partisanship
Men Women Difference
NES, 1952-1994 (Norrander 1997)
% Pure Independents 13 13 0
% Leaners 23 18 5*
% Weak Partisans 34 39 -5*
% Strong Partisans 30 30 0
# of cases 18,418 23,156
NES 2008-2009 Panel Study
% Pure Independents 13 12 0
% Leaners 25 16 9*
% Weak Partisans 27 33 -6*
% Strong Partisans 36 39 -3
# of cases 699 918
* indicates p < .05
Significant differences are bolded.
Percentages are rounded.
NES 2008-2009 data are from Wave 1.
Table 3.2 shows that the differences in strength of partisanship between men
and women revealed by Norrander sixteen years ago are still present, and may even
be more pronounced. From the NES’ 2008-2009 Panel Study, I find that men are
approximately 9 percentage points more likely to be independent leaners than women;
a difference-of-proportions test indicates that this is a significant margin. Women are
a statistically-significant 6 percentage points more likely to be weak partisans than
men. Similar to Norrander, I also find no statistically significant difference between
men and women in pure independent or strong partisan identification. Thus, the
gender gap in strength of partisanship, with men more likely to be leaners and
women more likely to be weak partisans, remains an interesting gender puzzle.
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In addition to their divergent choices in strength of partisanship, women and men
are also divided by Need to Evaluate and joiner status. Table 3.3 shows that, on
average, men have 4 percentage points higher Need to Evaluate and women have
6.5 percentage points higher joiner status. Student’s t-tests indicate that these dif-
ferences are statistically significant. I will now test Hypotheses 4-7 and show that
these gender-based differences in Need to Evaluate and joiner status account for a
significant chunk of the gender gap in strength of partisanship.
Table 3.3: Need to Evaluate and Joiner Status for Men and Women
Men Women Difference (In % of Variable Range)
Average Need to Evaluate .60 .56 4.0* (.04/1)
Average Joiner Status 1.09 1.22 -6.5* (.13/2)
* indicates p < .05
Means are rounded.
I now test Hypotheses 4-7 and determine how joiner status and Need to Evaluate
lead men and women to choose different strengths of partisanship. I run eight probits
that show that Need to Evaluate and/or joiner status distinguish between levels of
strength of partisanship in theoretically expected ways and demonstrate why men
are more likely to be leaners, women are less likely to be leaners, women are more
likely to be weak partisans, and men are less likely to be weak partisans.
To test Hypothesis 4A, I regress a dummy dependent variable measuring whether
the male respondent identifies as an independent leaner (1) or a pure independent
(0) on Need to Evaluate and a variety of controls. The results in Table 3.4 show that
Need to Evaluate does distinguish between male leaners and pure independents, such
that men with higher Need to Evaluate are more likely to identify as leaners. These
results provide support for Hypothesis 4A. Men are more likely to be leaners because
of Need to Evaluate. Not only does Need to Evaluate distinguish between leaners
and pure independents for men, but men’s higher Need to Evaluate leads them to be
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more likely to identify as leaners than would be the case if they had the lower levels
of Need to Evaluate that women do. If men had the lower average Need to Evaluate
that women do, more men would be pure independents and fewer would be leaners.
To test Hypothesis 4B, I regress a dummy dependent variable measuring whether
the male respondent identifies as a strong partisan (1) or an independent leaner (0)
on joiner status and a variety of controls. The results in Table 3.5 show that joiner
status does not distinguish between male strong partisans and leaners. It is not the
case that more men are leaners because their lower average joiner status leads them
to be more likely to identify as leaners than strong partisans. These results fail to
support Hypothesis 4B. Thus, Need to Evaluate appears primarily responsible for
why men are more likely to be leaners than they otherwise might be.
Table 3.4: Probits of Leaners (1) and Pure Independents (0) By Gender
Men Women
Intercept .06 (.70) -1.60** (.53)
Need to Evaluate .74* (.44) .95** (.48)
Age -.00 (.01) .01 (.01)
High School Graduate .18 (.58) .83** (.37)
Black -.30 (.43) -.11 (.37)
Catholic -.20 (.23) .37 (.24)
Married -.08 (.21) .14 (.19)
AIC 249.21 268.70
Residual Deviance 235.21 254.70
N of observations 190 199
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
All numbers rounded to 2 decimal places.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Need to Evaluate is also one reason why women are less likely to identify as lean-
ers. I regress a dummy dependent variable measuring whether a female respondent
identifies as an independent leaner (1) or pure independent (0) on Need to Evaluate
and controls. Table 3.4 shows that Need to Evaluate explains much of the difference
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Table 3.5: Probits of Strong Partisans (1) and Leaners (0) By Gender
Men Women
Intercept .12 (.51) .22 (.45)
Joiner Status .01 (.09) .19** (.08)
Age .00 (.01) -.00 (.00)
High School Graduate -.32 (.43) .05 (.40)
Black -.06 (.39) .65** (.27)
Catholic .13 (.19) -.14 (.17)
Married .33** (.17) .10 (.15)
AIC 409.66 428.02
Residual Deviance 395.66 414.02
N of observations 302 350
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
All numbers rounded to 2 decimal places.
Standard errors in parentheses.
between female leaners and pure independents; women with higher Need to Evaluate
are more likely to be leaners. However, because women have lower levels of Need to
Evaluate than men, women are as a group less likely to identify as leaners than they
otherwise would be. These results provide support for Hypothesis 5A.
Joiner status also explains why women are less likely to identify as independent
leaners than men are. Testing Hypothesis 5B, I run a probit of whether a female
respondent identifies as a strong partisan (1) or an independent leaner (0) on joiner
status and controls. The results are presented in Table 3.5. Women are less likely
to be leaners because of joiner status. Joiner status distinguishes between strong
partisans and leaners for women, and women with higher joiner status are more
likely to identify as strong partisans rather than leaners. If women had the lower
average joiner status that men have, more women would identify as leaners and fewer
would be strong partisans. Thus, I find support for Hypothesis 5B.
Having shown that both Need to Evaluate and joiner status account for some of
the difference between men and women in independent leaner identification, I now
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evaluate their effects on gender differences in weak partisan identification. To test
Hypothesis 6A, I run a probit of whether a male respondent identifies as a strong
partisan (1) or a weak partisan (0) on Need to Evaluate and controls. Table 3.6 shows
that Need to Evaluate significantly distinguishes between strong and weak partisans
for men; men with higher Need to Evaluate are more likely to be strong partisans.
If men had the lower levels of Need to Evaluate that women do, more men would
be weak partisans and fewer would be strong partisans. Therefore, Hypothesis 6A
is supported and Need to Evaluate partly explains why fewer men identify as weak
partisans.
Joiner status also explains why fewer men identify as weak partisans. To test
Hypothesis 6B, I regress a dummy dependent variable measuring whether a male
respondent identifies as a weak partisan (1) or a pure independent (0) on joiner
status and a variety of controls. As is evident in Table 3.7, joiner status significantly
distinguishes between male weak partisans and pure independents. Men with higher
joiner status are more likely to be weak partisans. If men had the higher average
joiner status that women do, more men would be weak partisans and fewer would
be pure independents. Hypothesis 6B is confirmed.
Need to Evaluate and joiner status also explain why women are more likely to
be weak partisans. To test Hypothesis 7A, I regress a dummy dependent variable
measuring whether a female respondent identifies as a strong partisan (1) or a weak
partisan (0) on Need to Evaluate and controls. Results are presented in Table 3.6.
As expected, Need to Evaluate significantly distinguishes between female strong and
weak partisans. Women with higher Need to Evaluate are more likely to be strong
partisans. However, because women have a lower levels of Need to Evaluate than
men, more women identify as weak partisans than would otherwise be the case.
These results confirm Hypothesis 7A.
To test Hypothesis 7B, I run a probit of whether a female respondent identifies
as a weak partisan (1) or a pure independent (0) on joiner status and controls. Table
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Table 3.6: Probits of Strong (1) and Weak Partisans (0) By Gender
Men Women
Intercept -.34 (.65) -1.40** (.38)
Need to Evaluate 1.15** (.35) 1.63** (.31)
Age .00 (.00) .01 (.00)
High School Graduate -.23 (.55) .30 (.30)
Black -.02 (.41) .64** (.20)
Catholic -.16 (.17) -.10 (.14)
Married -.03 (.18) -.11 (.12)
AIC 445.5 671.16
Residual Deviance 431.50 657.16
N of observations 329 510
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
All numbers rounded to 2 decimal places.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.7: Probits of Weak Partisans (1) & Pure Independents (0) By Gender
Men Women
Intercept .26 (.66) -.47 (.43)
Joiner Status .24** (.12) .17* (.10)
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
High School Graduate -.27 (.56) .57* (.33)
Black -.42 (.46) -.06 (.31)
Catholic -.00 (.22) .40* (.22)
Married .19 (.22) .47** (.17)
AIC 245.83 323.27
Residual Deviance 231.83 309.27
N of observations 189 285
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
All numbers rounded to 2 decimal places.
Standard errors in parentheses.
3.7 shows that joiner status significantly distinguishes between weak partisans and
pure independents for women; women with higher joiner status are more likely to be
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weak partisans. Women’s greater average joiner status leads them to be more likely
to identify as weak partisans than would be the case if they had the lower average
amount of joiner status that men do; Hypothesis 7B is supported.
My analysis reveals strong support for general Hypotheses 4-7. Need to Evaluate
and joiner status partly explain why men are more likely to be leaners and less likely
to be weak partisans, and why women are more likely to be weak partisans and less
likely to be leaners. Generally, I find that both Need to Evaluate and joiner status
are responsible for these differences, and all but one of specific Hypotheses 4A - 7B
is confirmed. The conflict-oriented, group identity theory of partisanship explain
part of the gender gap in strength of partisanship. Nonetheless, it is important to
quantify to some degree how much of this gap that Need to Evaluate and joiner
status explain.
To demonstrate quantitatively how important Need to Evaluate and joiner status
are for the gender gap in strength of partisanship, I use predicted probabilities for the
profile median respondent. Similar to what I did for men and women separately, I run
probits of the choice between leaner (1) and pure independent (0), strong partisan (1)
and leaner (0), strong partisan (1) and weak partisan (0), and weak partisan (1) and
pure independent (0) on Need to Evaluate/joiner status (as appropriate) and controls
for all respondents. The results are depicted in Table 3.8, and are similar to those in
Tables 3.4-3.7, with Need to Evaluate and joiner status significantly influencing the
choice between different strengths of partisanship in expected ways.1
Using the sample’s median respondent, I calculate this respondent’s probability
of identifying as an independent leaner or weak partisan for each of the four probits
depicted in Table 3.8. The sample’s median respondent is a 51-year-old, married,
1For those who want to see this analysis performed separately for men and women, using the
probit results from Tables 3.4-3.8, I provide these results in the “Assessing How Much Need to
Evaluate and Joiner Status Affect the Gender Gap, Separately for Men and Women” section of
Appendix B in Table B-1, along with a brief discussion.
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Table 3.8: Probits of 2 SPID Categories on N2E or Joiner Status
Leaner or Strong or Weak Partisan or Strong Partisan or
Pure Indie Weak Partisan Pure Indie Leaner
Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
Intercept -1.01** (.40) -1.12** (.32) -.24 (.35) .19 (.33)
Need to Eval. .83** (.32) 1.43** (.23) - -
Joiner Status - - .21** (.07) .12** (.06)
Age .00 (.00) .01** (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
High School Grad. .70** (.30) .17 (.25) .33 (.28) -.14 (.29)
Black -.24 (.28) .48** (.16) -.15 (.25) .51** (.21)
Catholic .09 (.16) -.12 (.11) .22 (.15) -.01 (.13)
Married .06 (.14) -.05 (.10) .34** (.13) .18* (.11)
AIC 512.10 1108.40 563.66 835.69
Residual Deviance 498.10 1094.4 549.66 821.69
N of observations 389 839 474 652
** indicates
p < .05
* indicates
p < .1
non-black respondent who is not Catholic and who has graduated from high school.
The sample’s male average Need to Evaluate is .6 and female average Need to Evalu-
ate is .56. The sample’s female average joiner status is 1.22, and male average joiner
status is 1.09 (see Table 3.3).
I compare this median respondent’s probability of identifying as an independent
leaner or weak partisan using the sample’s male average Need to Evaluate/joiner
status (as if this median respondent were male) and sample’s female Need to Eval-
uate/joiner status (as if this median respondent were female). These probabilities,
and the difference between them, are depicted in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Median Probabilities of Leaner & Weak Partisan Identification
With Mean With Mean Gender
Male Traits Female Traits Difference
Pr(Leaner Over Pure Independent) 66.5% 65.5% 1%
Pr(Leaner Over Strong Partisan) 33.5% 33% .5%
Pr(Weak Partisan Over Strong Partisan) 44% 46% 2%
Pr(Weak Partisan Over Pure Independent) 74.5% 75.5% 1%
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Consistent with the gender gap in strength of partisanship in general (see Ta-
ble 3.2), Table 3.9 shows that the sample’s (male) median respondent with average
male Need to Evaluate/joiner status is predicted to identify as a leaner more often
overall than his (female) counterpart with average female Need to Evaluate/joiner
status. The sample’s (female) median respondent with average female Need to Eval-
uate/joiner status is predicted to choose to be a weak partisan more often than her
male counterpart.
Table 3.9’s distinctions in predicted strength of partisanship between these two
median respondents are entirely caused by the male and female differences in average
Need to Evaluate and joiner status. These trait differences, equivalent to only 4%
of Need to Evaluate’s range2 and 6.5% of joiner status’ range3, have considerable
effects. Due to Need to Evaluate and joiner status, the (male) median respondent
is 1% more likely to identify as a leaner instead of a pure independent, and .5%
more likely to identify as a leaner instead of a strong partisan. Average gender
differences in Need to Evaluate and joiner status cause a total gender gap in leaner
identification for the median respondent of 1.5%.4 Given that the overall gender gap
in leaner identification (see Table 3.2) in the entire sample is only 9%, 1.5% is not
an inconsiderable amount.
Need to Evaluate and joiner status cause the (female) median respondent to be
2% more likely to identify as a weak partisan instead of a strong partisan, and 1%
more likely to identify as a weak partisan instead of a pure independent. Average
gender differences in Need to Evaluate and joiner status cause a total gender gap
in weak partisan identification for the median respondent of 3%.5 Since the overall
gender gap in weak partisan identification (see Table 3.2) in the entire sample is only
6%, 3% is a large amount! Thus, gender distinctions in average joiner status and
2 .6−.56
1 = .04
3 1.22−1.09
2 = .065
41% + .5% = 1.5%
52% + 1% = 3%
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Need to Evaluate account for a considerable part of the gender gap in strength of
partisanship.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The gender gap in strength of partisanship demonstrated by Norrander (1997)
persists, with men more likely to identify as independent leaners and women more
likely to identify as weak partisans. Additionally, women and men are divided by
two personality traits related to strength of partisanship, with women having higher
joiner status and men having higher Need to Evaluate. The conflict-oriented, group
identity theory of partisanship explains a significant part of the persistent gender gap
in strength of partisanship. Need to Evaluate and joiner status generally influence
male and female strength of partisanship in the same ways, but gender differences in
these traits lead men and women to tend toward different partisan identities.
As Norrander (1997) suggested, gender differences in tendency to join groups lead
women to be more likely to identify as weak partisans and less likely to choose to
be leaners. Persistent distinctions in male and female Need to Evaluate influence
men to be more likely to identify as independent leaners and less likely to be weak
partisans. For the sample’s median respondent, the amount of gap in strength of
partisanship created by gender differences in average joiner status and Need to Eval-
uate is illustrative. These two key traits are a significant reason why men are more
likely to identify as leaners and women are more likely to identify as weak partisans,
even though the average gender differences in these traits are only about 4-7% of
their ranges.
Need to Evaluate and joiner status help us understand some of the reasons why
men are more likely to identity as leaners and women are more likely to identify as
weak partisans. It’s not clear what other factors account for the rest of the gender
gap in strength of partisanship. Personality traits obviously account for some of the
gender gap, but perhaps genetic factors play some role as well. Gender differences in
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the relative importance of social identity and rational choice explanations of partisan
direction may play some role as well. Future research will build upon the results
presented here and work a toward a comprehensive explanation of the gender gap.
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IV RATIONAL CHOICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCES IN HOW
WOMEN AND MEN IDENTIFY AS PARTISANS
4.1 Introduction & Research Question
Research on partisanship in America has advanced two predominant explanations
of partisanship in the mass public: Social identity theory and rational choice theory
(Franklin and Jackson 1983, Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). Rational choice the-
ories explain partisanship as a combination of ideology and issue positions, while for
social identity theories, partisanship is determined by membership in demographic
groups.
Each theory has been shown to have explanatory power in different circumstances.
However, Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) demonstrate that rational choice expla-
nations of partisanship outperform social identity explanations of partisanship for
most Americans. Recent scholarship has often accepted this aggregate-level finding
without qualification.
This casual scholarly acceptance of the superiority of rational choice explana-
tions of partisanship without much exploration of potential variation in this finding
is surprising. It seems unlikely that rational choice outperforms social identity to the
same degree for all groups or in all circumstances. Broad groups of Americans vary
considerably in both the rational choice and social identity factors that determine
partisanship, including ideology, income, and racial identification (among many oth-
ers). Americans who identify as Hispanic, for example, are much more likely not to
use ideology terms like liberal, moderate, and conservative to describe themselves
than other groups (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011).
The explanatory power of rational choice and social identity theories should be
different for men and women. Women and men are noticeably distinct in several kinds
of political behavior, and scholars have done extensive research on the multi-faceted
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“gender gap” (Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998, Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and
Lin 2004, Olson and Green 2006, Kellstedt, Peterson, and Ramirez 2010, Lawless
and Fox 2013, Kanthak and Woon 2014). This gender-based variation includes sev-
eral factors that influence partisanship or strength of partisanship, including issue
positions and political attitudes (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Kauffman and Petro-
cik 1999, Atkeson and Rapaport 2003, Morton, Tyran, and Wengstrom 2011), Policy
Mood (Kellstedt, Peterson, and Ramirez 2010), and personality traits (Chapman et
al. 2007, Wang 2013).
In this paper, I demonstrate gender differences in the applicability of rational
choice and social identity theories of partisanship. We should expect ideology and
demographics to both significantly influence an American’s partisanship, but their
relative power to differ for women and men. I show that this is the case.
Rational choice models of partisanship are better than social identity models for
men and women. They are more related to partisanship, explain partisanship more
accurately, predict more Americans’s party IDs correctly, and create better models
of partisanship.
However, the rational choice and social identity models of partisanship are sig-
nificantly different for women and men, and the strength of their key explanatory
factors varies by gender. The explanatory advantage of rational choice models is
substantially bigger for men than it is for women. Ideology is a more important
cause of partisanship for men. For women, social identity models of partisanship are
comparatively better than they are for men. Demographics and group membership
are a more important part of partisanship for women, and repeatedly have different
effects on partisanship than they do for men.
These findings demonstrate an additional aspect of the gender gap: the applica-
bility of rational choice and social identity theories of partisanship. The causes of
party ID overlap for women and men, but are not the same. These findings demon-
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strate the importance of evaluating theories at multiple levels of analysis, and suggest
future areas of research in which this practice will be fruitful.
4.2 Literature Review
Political scientists’ explanations of partisanship have primarily derived from ra-
tional choice or social identity theories. Rational choice theory views partisanship as
a function of ideology and the sum of an individual’s issue positions (Downs 1957).
Consequently, it expects Americans to identify with the party (Democratic or Re-
publican) whose ideology and issue positions are closest to their own. In practice,
political behavior scholars typically analyze the rational choice model of partisan-
ship by analyzing the relationship between an individual’s self-reported ideology and
his or her partisanship (Fiorina 1977, Franklin and Jackson 1983, Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998, Shreckhise and Shields 2003).1
Social identity theory views partisanship as a group identity (Huddy, Mason,
and Aaroe 2010); you are a part of your party, and it is part of you. This theory
traces its lineage back to Campbell et al. (1960), and argues that an individual’s
partisanship reflects both how he or she sees the world, and his or her place in it.
Social identity theory expects Americans to examine the Democratic and Republican
party’s social group coalitions, and identify with the party whose coalition most
resembles themselves. In practice, political scientists usually evaluate the social
identity model of partisanship by examining the relationship between an American’s
partisanship and a wide variety of demographic attributes, including age, income,
religion, religiosity, racial identification, region of residence, education, and marital
status (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, Greene 2004). Other influential social
identity factors such as union membership or parental party identification are less
common on major surveys, but are examined when available.
1In the The American Voter Revisited, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) additionally summarize partisan
voting according to the rational choice model as: “Which party the person votes for is determined
in a pure rational-choice model by which party’s ideological position is closest to the voter’s” (27).
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Both rational choice and social identity theories have contributed greatly to our
understanding of partisanship (Abramowitz and Sauders 2006, Bafumi and Shapiro
2009). However, in recent years scholars have become interested in which theory pro-
vides the better model of partisanship (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). Because
each theory is part of a powerful and far-reaching broader body of theory, knowing
which one gives us the most realistic model of how Americans identify as Democrats
or Republicans is not a pedantic exercise. Whether social identity or rational choice
theory generally more accurately represents reality tells us much about how individ-
uals receive political information (Gerber and Green 1999, Bartels 2002), when and
how individuals change parties or realignment occurs (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz
2006), how partisanship shapes views of politicians and events (Fiorina 1981, Zaller
1992), and how candidates succeed in elections (Markus and Converse 1979, Edlin,
Gelman, and Kaplan 2007), among other things.
There is some consensus that rational choice theory overpowers social identity
theory and better explains partisanship for most Americans (Abramowitz and Saun-
ders 2006, Ellis 2010, Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012, Medeiros and Noel 2013).2 This
general agreement, while empirically justified, is surprisingly free of depth or nuance.
We have not extensively investigated how well social identity theory and rational
choice theory describe partisanship across recent elections or social groups.3
Political scientists are often interested in differences in political behavior between
politically important groups, including those that differ by ideology (Lupia, Levine,
Manning, and Sin 2007), racial identification (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling,
and Ha 2010), region of residence (Feller, Gelman, and Shor 2012), income (Gel-
man, Shor, Bafumi, and Park 2008), and personality (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and
2Sniderman and Stiglitz (2012) may put it best:“These partisans who appear on the pages of The
American Voter and its successor, The New American Voter, remain a political force. Yet, as an
overwhelming body of research now testifies, a signature fact of contemporary American electoral
politics is the conjunction or fusion of party identification and policy preferences” (emphasis mine).
3Laudably, Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) do this is in a limited fashion in their seminal
article (see Table 7), but following research has failed to expand upon their blueprint.
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Dowling 2012). This is especially true when those groups vary in how well they
are characterized by a particular theory or implied phenomena, such as economic
voting (Gelman, Shor, Bafumi, and Park 2008), valence perceptions of candidates
(Fulton 2013), or political information reception (Parker-Stephen 2013). Since the
predictions of good theories are borne out in reality, understanding when the accu-
racy of theories is different for important social groups is essential to a generalized
understanding of the political world.
To our credit, political scientists have done an excellent job with this in research-
ing the “gender gap.” Differences in the strength of theories and political phenomena
between men and women are often well-documented, well-researched, and even well-
publicized to a broad audience. This is true of issue positions (Conover 1988, Shapiro
and Mahajan 1986), movement in Policy Mood (Kellstedt, Peterson, and Ramirez
2010), voter turnout (McDonald 2007), willingness of quality candidates to run for
office (Kanthak and Woon 2014), political knowledge (Mondak and Anderson 2004),
and strength of partisanship (Ferguson 2014).
However, political scientists have not effectively analyzed any potential gender
gap in the two canonical theories of partisanship, rational choice theory and social
identity. There is some work that touches on this idea (Norrander 1997, Greene and
Elder 2001), but no thorough analysis. Both the popular press and scholars are well
aware of differences in partisanship and ideology between men and women (Sabato
2013)4, and yet political scientists have not looked carefully at how these might be
related to gender distinctions in our two canonical theories of partisanship.
Scholars need to examine gender differences in the applicability of rational choice
and social identity theories of partisanship for two reasons. First, examining variation
in the robustness of the two broad theories of partisanship between important social
groups is necessary to build generalizable knowledge of real political world. Second,
analyzing differences in the rational choice and social identity theories of partisanship
4Indeed, these differences were echoed interminably during the 2012 Presidential election.
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is critical for deepening research on the gender gap. The results in this paper are
highly relevant to both these ideas.
4.3 Theory
I have now shown why analyzing potential variation in the applicability of theories
of partisanship for men and women is important. However, this analysis is not just
warranted as a possibility. We should expect gender differences in the strength of
rational choice and social identity theories of partisanship.
Ferguson (2013) has shown the importance of two personality traits, Need to
Evaluate and joiner status, for determining and American’s strength of partisanship.
Furthermore, Ferguson (2014) has also shown the significant differences between
women and men in these traits (See Table 4.1, reproduced from Ferguson’s Table
3.3).5 Men are higher in Need to Evaluate, and women have greater joiner status.
Ferguson (2014) shows that this explains a large part of why men are more likely
to identify as independent leaners and women are more likely to identify as weak
partisans.
Table 4.1: Average Need to Evaluate and Joiner Status for Men and Women
Men Women Difference (In % of Variable Range)
Average Need to Evaluate .60 .56 4.0* (.04/1)
Average Joiner Status 1.09 1.22 -6.5* (.13/2)
* indicates p < .05
Means are rounded.
5Bizer, Krosnick, Petty, Rucker, and Wheeler (2000, 41) also show that men have higher average
Need to Evaluate than women, and Bizer, Krosnick, Holbrook, Wheeler, Rucker, and Petty (2004)
additionally corroborate this finding.
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Gender differences in Need to Evaluate and joiner status should lead us to expect
gender differences in the applicability of rational choice and social identity theories of
partisanship. While these two traits are directly related to strength of partisanship
(Ferguson 2013), they should also be indirectly related to partisanship. An Ameri-
can’s Need to Evaluate is a personality trait that is fundamentally about preferences
and the source of preferences. Ferguson (2013) writes:
“According to Nir (2011), those who have a high Need to Evaluate have a
“chronic tendency” to “form evaluative thoughts and judgments (Jarvis
and Petty 1996),” dislike remaining neutral, “would rather take a stand
than remain noncommittal,” and have strong affective intensity toward
parties, candidates, and objects in general (pgs. 509 - 510). Furthermore,
those high in Need to Evaluate are more likely to evaluate candidates and
the Republican and Democratic parties and liberalism and conservatism
in a bipolar, or diametrically opposing way (Federico 2007).”
In other words, individuals high in Need to Evaluate are more likely to both
have strong preferences on many things and apply them to related concepts. Those
concepts include ideology and partisanship. Thus, we should expect that individuals
high in Need to Evaluate will be more likely to apply their ideology to their parti-
sanship. The core of the rational choice theory of partisanship is that an individual’s
ideology and issue positions determine his or her partisanship. Therefore, individu-
als higher in Need to Evaluate should be more accurately described by the rational
choice theory of partisanship. Because men tend to have higher Need to Evaluate
than women, the rational choice theory of partisanship should be a comparatively
better model of partisanship for men than it is for women.
Along with Need to Evaluate, an individual’s joiner status should also be indi-
rectly related to partisanship. An American’s joiner status reflects his or her latent
tendency to join groups, of any kind. Those high in joiner status report that they
are part of many groups. Some people tend to be “joiners” who are a part of many
groups, while others simply are not (Putnam 2001). Group membership is impor-
tant for Americans who are high in joiner status. We should expect, therefore,
62
that Americans who are high in joiner status should be more likely to connect their
group membership with their partisanship. The essence of the social identity the-
ory of partisanship is that an individual’s group membership determines his or her
partisanship. Thus, individuals higher in joiner status should be more accurately
described by the social identity theory of partisanship. Since women tend to have
higher joiner status than men, the social choice theory of partisanship should be a
comparatively better model of partisanship for women than it is for men.6
These gender differences in how well the two theories describe partisanship should
lead to the causes of partisanship influencing male and female partisanship in sig-
nificantly different ways. The rational choice theory of partisanship should apply
comparatively more to men than women, and the social identity theory of partisan-
ship should apply comparatively more to women than men. Nevertheless, given the
strong empirical evidence supporting it, the rational choice theory of partisanship
should be superior (in absolute terms) to the social identity theory for both men and
women. Contemporary American parties are strongly ideological, both in Congress
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) and at a mass level (Abramowitz 2010), and
this should be reflected among men and women as well as the American public as a
whole (as it is in Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). In the rest of this paper, I show
support for these expectations.
4.4 Designs for Assessing Theory
To robustly demonstrate gender differences in the applicability of theories of par-
tisanship, I take advantage of several datasets. These datasets span multiple recent
election years, two different types of election years (Presidential and Congressional
midterm), and have a combined N of respondents of over 100,000 Americans. The
6There are certainly other potential reasons why the social identity model of partisanship would
apply more for women than men. For example, modern American political candidates and parties
often encourage women to think of themselves as a group, in ways that they typically do not
for men. The analysis here is focused on demonstrating the empirical differences in partisanship
between women and men, however, not on arguing for a unique theoretical cause of those differences.
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2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), American National Elec-
tion Studies’ (NES) 2008-2009 Panel Study, 2008 online National Annenberg Election
Study (NAES), and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) each in-
clude the variables necessary to model partisanship according to the rational choice
and social identity theories.
The rational choice theory of partisanship is typically operationalized for analysis
using regressions of respondent partisanship on a variable measuring respondent ide-
ology.7 Each of these 4 datasets measures respondent partisanship and ideology. The
social identity theory of partisanship is usually operationalized for study by regress-
ing self-reported partisanship on a variety of demographic variables, including age,
education level, income, racial identification, religion, religiosity, region of residence,
marital status, and union membership and parental identification (when available).
Franklin and Jackson (1983) use almost this exact model (see Tables A.2-A.4), ex-
cept for marital status and religiosity, which were only subsequently discovered to be
strong causes of partisanship.8 The 2006 CCES, 2008-2009 NES Panel Study, 2008
NAES, and 2010 CCES all have questions that measure these concepts.9 In addition,
each of these four surveys measures respondent gender.
Each the explanatory variables in the social identity model is theoretically mo-
tivated. Age has long been related to partisanship through cohort effects. Level
of education has had a strong relationship with partisanship in recent years, though
that relationship appears to be non-linear (motivating the use of dummy variables for
level of education rather than a scale). Income has long been a well-known partisan
7This model is explicitly described by Franklin and Jackson (1983), who summarize the rational
choice model of partisanship as: The “Downsian model took voters’ issue positions as exogenous to
party preference. In this structure party identification was a summary of policy preferences” (958)
indicated by ideology.
8Weisberg (1987) first prominently described the “marriage gap” in partisan voting. The rela-
tionship between religiosity and partisanship, at least in America, did not become general knowl-
edge until at least Layman and Carmines (1997) or possibly Layman (2001). Layman and Carmines
(1997, see Table 2) use a similar model of partisanship as well.
9Except parental identification and union membership, which are not commonly included on
surveys and are not included in all of these datasets.
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cleavage, with higher-income voters more likely to identify as Republican, though
Gelman, Shor, Bafumi, and Park’s (2008) research adds considerable nuance to this
relationship.
In contemporary America, racial identification and party ID are closely related,
with respondents who identify as black or Hispanic significantly more likely to be
Democrats. Religion matters for party identification because Protestants and Catholics
tend to be somewhat more likely to be Republicans than those who have another
religion or no religion. Religiosity, or how devout someone is regardless of religion,
has been shown to strongly influence partisanship (see Layman 2001). In the last
decade or two, Southerners have identified as more Republican than the rest of the
country, and so a dummy variable for South is included in the analysis. Marital
status has been an influential factor on partisanship since the 1980s (see Weisberg
1987), with married Americans more likely to be Republican and single Americans
more likely to be Democrats.
All of explanatory variables used in the social identity model are theoretically
motivated. This theoretical basis makes the use of these explanatory variables de-
sirable, even though including them all is not parsimonious. Furthermore, as noted
above, the explanatory variables used in this social identity model are very similar
to those used in well-cited, top-tier research.
Researchers who primarily study the social identity model of partisanship might
critique my social identity model analysis below because it does not include a vari-
able measuring a respondent’s parental party identification. I certainly would like
to include this variable in my analysis; maternal and paternal partisanship do influ-
ence the offspring’s party identification. Parental partisanship is unfortunately not
available in all these data sets.
Nevertheless, I do not expect the absence of parental party identification to signif-
icantly affect my social identity model results. Other demographic variables in the
model partially capture the expected influence of parental partisanship. Parental
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and child party ID are positively correlated, but so are parental and child education
level, parental and child income, parental and child religion, parental and child racial
identification, and parental and child region of residence. In that sense, several of
the other variables in the social identity capture some of the expected influence of
parental party ID.
Some research has also suggested that the influence of parental partisanship on
child partisanship may not always be due to social identity reasons. It is not necessar-
ily the case that parental party ID influence child party ID because of shared group
membership and familial ties. Achen (2002) shows how the influence of parental
partisanship on child partisanship may be the result of a process of information up-
dating and learning about politics during youth, instead of social identity. If so,
then parental partisanship should not be treated as a purely “social identity” vari-
able, and perhaps does not belong in the social identity model of partisanship at
all. Therefore, while I would prefer the option of including parental party ID in my
social identity model of partisanship, its influence is captured in part through other
variables in the model and it may not be able to be treated as a purely social identity
factor. I am confident that the absence of parental partisanship does not seriously
change my social identity model results.
Using the 2006 CCES, 2008-2009 NES Panel Study, 2008 NAES, and 2010 CCES,
I first show that the general, aggregate wisdom about the superiority of the ratio-
nal choice theory holds for each gender. The rational choice model of partisanship
outperforms the social identity model for both women and men in all datasets.
Next, I demonstrate that a closer examination of the data reveals considerable
gender differences in the rational choice and social identity models of partisanship.
As expected, the rational choice model is comparatively better for men, and the
social identity model is comparatively better for women. These findings hold across
all four datasets.
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Finally, I show that these gender differences in the sources of partisanship are
considerable. Chow tests indicate that the rational choice model of partisanship for
men is always significantly different than the rational choice model for women, and
the social identity model for women is always significantly different than the social
identity model for men. However, these differences in models are not merely statis-
tical. For the social identity model, these differences are demonstrably substantive
as well. The significance of several demographic variables and their directions of
effect on partisanship vary by gender; these variables include age, level of education,
religion, and marital status.
I test the following general and specific hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 8: The rational choice model of partisanship is a better
model of partisanship than the social identity model of partisanship.
– Hypothesis 8A: For men, the rational choice model of partisan-
ship is a better model of partisanship than the social identity
model of partisanship.
– Hypothesis 8B: For women, the rational choice model of parti-
sanship is a better model of partisanship than the social identity
model of partisanship.
• Hypothesis 9: There are considerable gender differences in how well
the rational choice and social identity models explain partisanship.
– Hypothesis 9A: The rational choice model of partisanship ex-
plains partisanship comparatively better for men than women.
– Hypothesis 9B: The social identity model of partisanship ex-
plains partisanship comparatively better for women than men.
• Hypothesis 10: The sources of partisanship are significantly different
for women and men.
67
– Hypothesis 10A: The rational choice model of partisanship is
significantly different for women and men.
– Hypothesis 10B: The social identity model of partisanship is
significantly different for women and men.
I demonstrate support for general Hypotheses 8-10, and specific Hypotheses 8A,
8B, 9A, 9B, 10A, and 10B. The results show that the rational choice theory of
partisanship explains party ID better for men and women. However, women and men
vary considerably in how well the rational choice and social identity models describe
partisanship. For women, the rational choice model outperforms the social identity
model, but not by much. Social identity and demographic factors are comparatively
more influential and related to party ID for women than they are for men. In contrast,
I find that the rational choice model is a much better model of partisanship for men
than the social identity model. Ideology is a more important cause of party ID for
men than women.
I then provide a variety of evidence demonstrating these substantial gender dif-
ferences in model performance. Not only does the explanatory power of these models
vary by gender, but Chow tests reveal that the rational choice and social identity
models are always significantly different for men and women.
These findings show that the sources of partisanship for men and women, though
overlapping, are different. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings
for future research.
4.5 Data and Results
To demonstrate support for Hypotheses 8-10, I take advantage of data from the
2006 CCES, 2008-2009 NES Panel Study, 2008 NAES, and 2010 CCES. Each of
these surveys measures Partisanship using the seven-point scale common on many
academic surveys. This scale runs from Strong Democrat to Weak Democrat to
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Independent Lean Democrat to Pure Independent to Independent Lean Republican
to Weak Republican to Strong Republican.
All of these surveys contain a measure of respondent ideology, which is necessary
to model partisanship according the rational choice theory. Ideology is measured
using the “traditional” NES seven-point scale on the 2008-2009 NES Panel and the
2008 NAES. The traditional NES scale runs from Extremely Liberal to Liberal to
Slightly Liberal to Moderate to Slightly Conservative to Conservative to Extremely
Conservative.
For the 2010 CCES data, Ideology is measured using a slightly different seven-
point scale, which runs Very Liberal to Liberal to Somewhat Liberal to Middle of the
Road to Somewhat Conservative to Conservative to Very Conservative. The 2006
CCES has a five-point Ideology scale, which runs from Very Liberal to Liberal to
Moderate to Conservative to Very Conservative. Because the 2006 CCES, 2008-2009
NES Panel Study, 2008 NAES, and 2010 CCES data are analyzed separately (not
pooled), using these different (though conceptually similar) measures of Ideology
is an asset and provides evidence of construct validity and generalizability across
different data sets.
Each of these four surveys also includes the variables needed to operationalize the
social identity model of partisanship. Male is a dummy variable that takes a value of
1 for men and 0 for women for all datasets. I use three dummy variables to capture
a respondent’s level of education. Post-Grad Degree is a 1 if the respondent has a
post-baccalaureate degree, and a 0 otherwise. Only College Degree takes a value of
1 if respondent has a college degree, but no advanced degree, and 0 otherwise. No
HS Degree is a 1 if the respondent has not finished high school and 0 otherwise. The
Age variable captures how old a respondent is. It ranges from 18 to 95 for the 2006
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CCES, 18 to 100+ for the 2008 NAES10, 18 to 90 for the 2008-2009 NES Panel, and
18 to 91 for the 2010 CCES.
A respondent’s Income is measured in a couple of different ways. The 2006 CCES
and 2010 CCES code Income as an ordinal scale that ranges in level from 1 (respon-
dent earns less than $10,000 per year) to 14 (respondent earns $150,000 or more).
The 2008-2009 NES Panel and 2008 NAES measure Income as an ordinal scale that
ranges from 1 (respondent earns less than $5,000 dollars per year) to 19 (respondent
earns more than $175,000 dollars per year). The racial identification of respondents
is captured in 2 dummy variables. The variable Black codes Americans as 1 if they
identify as Black, and 0 otherwise.11 The variable Hispanic codes Americans as 1 if
they identify as Hispanic, and 0 otherwise.
On all of these surveys, the dummy variable Married has a value of 1 if the
respondent is married and 0 otherwise. The religion of respondents captured in two
dummy variables. Protestant is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as part of
any Protestant Christian denomination, and 0 otherwise. Catholic is coded as 1 if
the respondent identifies as Catholic, and 0 otherwise. For each of these surveys, a
respondent’s region of residence is measuring using South, a dummy variable. South
takes a value of 1 if the respondent lives in one of the states that fought for the
Confederacy, and 0 otherwise.
The variable Religiosity measures respondent religiosity, and varies somewhat by
survey. For the 2006 CCES, Religiosity is an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 to
4 and captures how often the respondent attends religious services. It ranges from
Almost Never or Never to Less Than Once a Month to A Few Times a Month to
Once a Week or More. On the 2008 NAES, Religiosity is an ordinal scale that
10I truncated the Age variable at 100 due to a suspicious number of age responses over 109.
There were 7 respondents who said they were 109 and 8 who said they were 110, which is incredibly
unlikely in a survey with less than 35,000 respondents. This is statistically near-impossible through
sampling, since only 341 people in America were alive past 110 in 2010 (see: http://phys.org/
news194881239.html).
11On the 2008-2009 NES Panel and 2008 NAES, respondents are coded as 1 if they identify as
non-Hispanic Black, and 0 otherwise.
70
ranges from 1 to 6 and captures how often the respondent attends religious services.
It ranges from Never to Once a Year or Less to A Few Times a Year to Once or
Twice a Month to Once a Week to More Than Once a Week. For the 2008-2009
NES Panel, Religiosity is a continuous variable that measures how many days per
year the respondent reports attending religious services, not including weddings or
funerals, and ranges from 0 days per year to over 300. On the 2010 CCES, Religiosity
is an ordinal scale that ranges from 0 to 5 and captures how often the respondent
attends religious services, not including weddings or funerals. It ranges from Never
to Seldom to A Few Times a Year to Once or Twice a Month to Once a Week to
More Than Once a Week. Taken together, these variables allow us to operationalize
the social identity theory of partisanship very well.
Having described the data that I use, I now turn to my analysis. To test Hypoth-
esis 8, I run OLS regressions that represent the rational choice and social identity
models of partisanship. As is discussed in the “Designs for Assessing Theory” section
previously, these models are conventionally used and accepted in literature. For the
rational choice model of partisanship, I regress the seven-point Partisanship scale
on the Ideology scale for men and women separately for all datasets. To model the
social identity theory of partisanship, I regress the Partisanship scale on Age, No HS
Degree, Post-Grad Degree, Only College Degree, Income, Black, Hispanic, Protes-
tant, Catholic, South, Married, and Religiosity for women and men separately for all
datasets.
Table 4.2 displays the results of these regressions for men, and Table 4.3 has the
results of these regressions for women. Both Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 also include
each regression model’s R2 (adjusted), Root Mean-Squared Error (RMSE), average
absolute-valued error (or mean absolute error), % of respondents classified to within
.5 of their true partisanship, and % of respondents classified over 3 categories away
from their true partisanship, along with AIC, Small-Sample AIC (AICc), and BIC.12
12Because the N of respondents is different for the rational choice and social identity models in
all data sets, the AIC, AICc, BIC presented in these Tables are from different rational choice and
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Table 4.2: OLS Regressions of Models for Men
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES Panel 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
Rational Choice
Intercept -.39** (.04) -.62** (.13) -.05 (.06) -.04 (.02)
Ideology 1.40** (.01) .82** (.03) .96** (.01) .91** (.00)
R2 .46 .47 .44 .58
RMSE 1.55 1.64 1.66 1.41
Mean Absolute Error 1.25 1.25 1.34 1.13
% Predicted Correctly 27.31 25.58 19.84 24.61
% Predicted Poorly 4.04 8.56 6.28 3.44
AIC 14193.86 511.37 7139.64 18491.13
AICc 56397.93 1957.90 25593.52 85983.52
BIC 56420.75 1970.55 25613.86 86007.75
N of observations 16,664 1,122 8,068 25,810
Social Identity
Intercept 3.02** (.08) 2.09** (.52) 2.95** (.15) 2.76** (.07)
Age -.01** (.00) -.01 (.01) -.00* (.00) .01** (.00)
No HS Degree .14 (.09) -1.21* (.64) -.37** (.13) -.06 (.10)
Post-Grad Degree -.20** (.06) -.97** (.25) -.42** (.08) -.70** (.04)
Only College Degree .21** (.05) -.26 (.23) .05 (.06) -.22** (.03)
Income .05** (.01) .06** (.03) .03** (.01) .03** (.00)
Black -1.69** (.06) -2.35** (.49) -2.46** (.10) -2.11** (.05)
Hispanic -.60** (.06) -.99** (.49) -.65** (.11) -.58** (.05)
Protestant .63** (.04) .76** (.22) .35** (.07) .79** (.03)
Catholic .29** (.05) .76** (.25) -.17** (.07) .49** (.04)
South .08** (.04) .52** (.21) .22** (.06) .21** (.03)
Married .54** (.04) .19 (.24) .28** (.06) .39** (.03)
Religiosity .28** (.01) .01** (.00) .26** (.02) .19** (.01)
R2 .14 .14 .15 .17
RMSE 1.96 2.05 2.06 2.01
Mean Absolute Error 1.66 1.74 1.78 1.69
% Predicted Correctly 16.70 14.59 12.35 18.14
% Predicted Poorly 11.68 12.45 13.49 13.00
AIC 20816.31 774.96 9424.15 34149.48
AICc 63020.41 2222.29 27878.09 101641.9
BIC 63126.88 2280.70 27972.94 101755
N of observations 14,539 514 6,403 23,169
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
Standard errors in ()
Numbers rounded to
2 decimal places.
These additional statistics and model criteria allow for robust comparisons of these
models in a variety of ways.
The mean absolute error, % of respondents classified to within .5 of their true
partisanship, and % of respondents classified over 3 categories away from their true
partisanship are three statistics that are not commonly included in OLS model re-
social identity models with the same (smaller) N of respondents that are not displayed. The models
with less respondents are not substantively different from those presented.
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Table 4.3: OLS Regressions of Models for Women
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES Panel 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
Rational Choice
Intercept -.63** (.04) -.76** (.11) -.32** (.05) -.03 (.02)
Ideology 1.42** (.01) .81** (.02) .99** (.01) .87** (.01)
R2 .42 .44 .42 .50
RMSE 1.70 1.76 1.74 1.61
Mean Absolute Error 1.39 1.39 1.42 1.28
% Predicted Correctly 19.61 19.13 16.80 20.84
% Predicted Poorly 6.07 9.99 7.22 6.51
AIC 12960.54 664.83 8310.16 20455.43
AICc 49471.83 2659.06 29766.51 82416.8
BIC 49494.22 2672.69 29787.3 82440.78
N of observations 17,091 1,542 10,476 26,438
Social Identity
Intercept 2.70** (.08) 2.37** (.41) 2.91** (.12) 2.71** (.06)
Age -.01** (.00) -.03** (.01) -.01** (.00) -.00 (.00)
No HS Degree .02 (.10) .04 (.38) -.23** (.11) .05 (.10)
Post-Grad Degree -.65** (.07) -.79** (.23) -.85** (.07) -.80** (.05)
Only College Degree -.05 (.05) -.65** (.21) -.26** (.06) -.30** (.03)
Income .03** (.01) .09** (.02) .01** (.01) .02** (.00)
Black -1.75** (.06) -2.17** (.28) -2.65** (.07) -2.27** (.04)
Hispanic -.48** (.06) -.93** (.34) -.75** (.09) -.65** (.05)
Protestant .52** (.04) .82** (.19) .20** (.05) .67** (.03)
Catholic .03 (.05) .14 (.22) -.29** (.06) .31** (.04)
South .19** (.04) .50** (.19) .36** (.05) .31** (.03)
Married .47** (.04) .53** (.18) .46** (.05) .35** (.03)
Religiosity .38** (.01) .01** (.00) .31** (.01) .24** (.01)
R2 .16 .22 .21 .20
RMSE 2.03 2.07 2.04 2.01
Mean Absolute Error 1.74 1.74 1.77 1.72
% Predicted Correctly 14.57 13.92 12.47 14.88
% Predicted Poorly 12.23 14.20 12.19 12.58
AIC 18118.31 1019.20 10952.35 30626.71
AICc 54629.63 3014.00 32408.76 92588.1
BIC 54734.07 3077.15 32505.73 92699.96
N of observations 14,392 697 8,804 23,906
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
Standard errors in ()
Numbers rounded to
2 decimal places.
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sults, but each provides a valuable comparison. Like the RMSE, the mean absolute
error is a statistic that captures how distant the model’s predicted values are from
the true values of the dependent variable. However, the average absolute error is
more intuitively meaningful and easier to describe, since it simply measures in ab-
solute terms how far off on average the model’s predicted values are from the true
ones.
The model statistic of % of respondents classified to within .5 of their true par-
tisanship (the dependent variable) is included as a way of assessing how good the
model is at predicting the “correct” values of partisanship. Partisanship is measured
as a seven-point scale of integer values, but the model predicts decimal values (such
as 5.73 or 2.4) that are not meaningful on that seven-point Partisanship scale. How-
ever, one can round the predicted values to the nearest whole integer and have a
meaningful prediction of partisanship (such as rounding 5.73 to 6). In that sense,
predicting a respondent’s partisanship to within .5 of its true value is equivalent to
predicting that person’s partisanship “correctly.” By measuring the percentage of
respondents “correctly” classified by the model, I have another way of evaluating
how well the model naively predicts partisanship without including other factors.
This is valuable because it allows me assess how well the operationalization of each
partisanship theory stands on its own.
Similarly, measuring the % of respondents classified over 3 categories away from
their true partisanship gives me an additional useful statistic on model power. The
partisanship of each of these respondents is predicted terribly by the model, such that
the model actually guesses incorrectly as to the mere direction of their partisanship.
Since the model’s prediction is more than 3 categories away from the truth on a seven-
point scale, it means that respondents are, at minimum, expected to favor a party
that they do not.13 These respondents are deemed to be “Predicted Poorly.” The
13Ex. Weak Democrats are predicted to be Republican Leaners or more Republican, Democrat
Leaners are predicted to Weak Republicans or more Republican, Pure Independents are predicted
to be Strong Democrats or Strong Republicans, Strong Republicans are predicted to be on the
Democratic side of Independent, etc.
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% Predicted Poorly by each model tells us how often each model gets partisanship
completely wrong.
The results depicted in Table 4.2 strongly support Hypothesis 8A.14 For every
statistic and model criteria displayed, the rational choice model of partisanship for
men is superior to the social identity model. The R2 of the rational choice models
for all datasets is much higher (ranging from .44 to .58) than the R2 for the social
identity models for all datasets (ranging from .14 to .17). Ideology is more correlated
with partisanship than demographics for men, and the rational choice model accounts
for a greater amount of the variance in male partisanship than the social identity
model does.
Furthermore, the rational choice model has consistently lower RMSE and mean
absolute error than the social identity model for men. On average, the rational choice
model’s predictions of respondent partisanship are closer to their true values. In
fact, for the 2010 CCES, the rational choice model typically predicts a respondent’s
partisanship to within about one category away from its true value! The social
identity model’s predictions are never as close. Additionally, the rational choice
model “correctly” predicts a much higher percentage of male partisans. The rational
choice model “correctly” predicts between 19.84% and 27.31% of male respondents, or
often about one in every four. The social identity model, in contrast, only “correctly”
predicts between 12.35% and 18.14% of male respondents, or around one in every
six. The rational choice model predicts less “poorly” as well. Only between 3.44%
and 8.56% of male respondents are predicted “poorly” by the rational choice model,
in contrast to between 11.68% and 13.49% predicted “poorly” by the social identity
model.
Important model criteria all choose the rational choice models over the social
identity models for men. The rational choice models’ lower AIC and Small-Sample
14Due to abnormally few respondents being asked their Religiosity, in the 2008-2009 NES Panel
Study, the N of respondents for the 2008-2009 NES Panel social identity model is only about half
the N of the comparable rational choice model. These differences in N for the two models for the
2008-2009 NES Panel are present in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
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AIC suggest that the rational choice model is less distant from the true model of
partisanship than the social identity model. The rational choice models also have
lower BIC than the social identity models; this indicates that the rational choice
model is more likely to be the true model of partisanship than the social identity
model.
On the basis of Table 4.2, I conclude that the casual wisdom about the rational
choice and social identity models holds at a deeper level: The rational choice model of
partisanship is a much better model of partisanship for men than the social identity
model. The evidence in Table 4.2 strongly support Hypothesis 8A.
Table 4.3 provides evidence that strongly supports Hypothesis 8B. The rational
choice model outperforms the social identity model for women on every measure. For
all datasets, the rational choice model’s R2 (ranging from .42 to .50) is substantially
higher than the social identity model’s R2 (ranging from .16 to .22) for women.
The rational choice model captures a greater amount of the variation in female
partisanship than the social identity model. Similar to the way it is for men, ideology
is more correlated with party ID for women than demographics are.
The rational choice model for women is also better at knowing the truth. On
average, the rational choice model guesses female party ID considerably closer to its
true value than the social identity model does. The RMSE and mean absolute error
are consistently lower for the rational choice model (the RMSE ranges from 1.61 to
1.76, the mean absolute error ranges from 1.28 to 1.42) for women than the social
identity model (the RMSE ranges from 2.01 to 2.07, the mean absolute error ranges
from 1.72 to 1.77). The closest rational choice model’s (the 2010 CCES’) predictions
are only off on average by a category and a quarter, the closest social identity model’s
(the 2010 CCES’) predictions are typically off by closer to 2 categories.
Furthermore, the rational choice model usually predicts about one in five women’s
partisanship “correctly,” while the social identity model for women typically only pre-
dicts about one in seven women’s party ID “correctly.” The rational choice model
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predicts less “poorly” for women, too. Between 6.07% and 9.99% of female respon-
dents are predicted “poorly” by the rational choice model, while between 12.19% and
14.20% are predicted “poorly” by the social identity model. All the relevant model
criteria choose the rational choice model over the social identity model for women,
for all data sets. The AIC, AICc, and BIC are lower for the rational choice model
than the social identity model in all cases. Therefore, I can confidently confirm Hy-
pothesis 8B on the basis of Table 4.3. As expected, the aggregate knowledge that
the rational choice model outperforms the social identity model of partisanship holds
for women only.15
I now move to testing Hypothesis 9. The rational choice model explains parti-
sanship better than the social identity model for both women and men, as expected.
However, we should expect there to be substantial gender differences in how well
these two models explain party ID.
Table 4.4 shows support for this idea. The rational choice model of partisanship
is comparatively much better for men than women, and the social identity model is
comparatively better for women than for men. Table 4.4 displays model fit statistics
from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 side by side, so that they can more easily be compared across
model and gender. It also displays, for each gender, the absolute-valued difference
between the rational choice and social identity model statistics. This highlights the
contrast for men and women in the difference between the two models.
For men, the rational choice model is a much better model of party ID than the
social identity model. The difference between the models in R2 ranges from .29 to .41,
underscoring that ideology is much more correlated with partisanship for men than
15One might additionally consider the overlap in model predictive power. Of the respondents’
partisanship “correctly” predicted by one model, how many of them are also predicted correctly by
the other model? The rational choice model “correctly” guesses more of the respondents “correctly”
predicted by the social identity model than the social identity model does of those “correctly”
classified by rational choice. In other words, the rational choice model “correctly” identifies the
partisanship of a higher percentage of respondents that would not be “correctly” predicted by the
other model. This pattern is depicted in Table C-1 in Appendix C, and holds for women and men
in all four data sets.
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Table 4.4: Statistics and Comparison of Models of Partisanship By Gender
Men
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES Panel 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
fake Rational Choice
R2 .46 .47 .44 .58
RMSE 1.55 1.64 1.66 1.41
Mean Absolute Error 1.25 1.25 1.34 1.13
% Predicted Correctly 27.31 25.58 19.84 24.61
% Predicted Poorly 4.04 8.56 6.28 3.44
fake Social Identity
R2 .14 .14 .15 .17
RMSE 1.96 2.05 2.06 2.01
Mean Absolute Error 1.66 1.74 1.78 1.69
% Predicted Correctly 16.70 14.59 12.35 18.14
% Predicted Poorly 11.68 12.45 13.49 13.00
fake |Difference in Models|
R2 .32 .33 .29 .41
RMSE .41 .41 .4 .6
Mean Absolute Error .41 .49 .44 .56
% Predicted Correctly 10.61 10.99 7.49 6.47
% Predicted Poorly 7.64 3.89 7.21 9.56
fake
Women
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES Panel 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
fake Rational Choice
R2 .42 .44 .42 .50
RMSE 1.70 1.76 1.74 1.61
Mean Absolute Error 1.39 1.39 1.42 1.28
% Predicted Correctly 19.61 19.13 16.80 20.84
% Predicted Poorly 6.07 9.99 7.22 6.51
fake Social Identity
R2 .16 .22 .21 .20
RMSE 2.03 2.07 2.04 2.01
Mean Absolute Error 1.74 1.74 1.77 1.72
% Predicted Correctly 14.57 13.92 12.47 14.88
% Predicted Poorly 12.23 14.20 12.19 12.58
fake |Difference in Models|
R2 .26 .22 .21 .30
RMSE .33 .31 .30 .40
Mean Absolute Error .35 .35 .35 .44
% Predicted Correctly 5.04 5.21 4.33 5.96
% Predicted Poorly 6.16 4.21 4.97 6.07
Numbers rounded to
2 decimal places.
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demographics. There is also a large difference in how close each model’s predicted
values are to the respondents’ true partisanship. The difference in RMSE and average
absolute error for the two models for men is large, with the rational choice model’s
predictions typically off by half a category less than the social identity model. Since
the models are predicting categories on a seven-point scale, that is a big distinction.
The percent of “correct” predictions best illustrates how much better the rational
choice model is than the social identity model for men. The rational choice model
describes male partisanship a lot better, predicting as many as 11% more respon-
dents’ party ID “correctly.” That is 11% in absolute terms;16 percentage-wise, the
rational choice model for men is as much as 75% better17 at “correctly” predicting
respondent partisanship than the social identity model. Thus, the difference between
the rational choice and social identity models for men is stark.
In contrast, for women the rational choice model is better, but not as much as
it is for men. The social identity model is more important for women than the
social identity model is for men. The difference in R2 between the social identity
and rational choice models for women (ranging from .21 to .30) is not as large as
it is for men (ranging from .29 to .40); the difference is consistently about .1 lower
than it is for men. Similarly, the rational choice model predicts partisanship better
for women than the social identity model, but not as much as it does for men. The
RMSE and mean absolute error are still lower (indicating the model’s fitted values
are closer to the truth) for the rational choice model for women than they are for
the social identity model, but the difference between them is not as much as it is for
men. For women, the rational choice model’s fitted values are usually about a third
of a category closer to the respondent’s true partisanship than the social identity
model’s fitted values; for men this difference is about half a category.
16For the 2008-2009 NES Panel, the absolute difference in percent “correctly” predicted by the
rational choice model over the social identity model is 25.58 - 14.59 = 10.99%.
17For the 2008-2009 NES Panel, the percentage difference in percent “correctly” predicted by the
rational choice model over the social identity model is 25.58/14.59 = 1.75, or a 75% increase.
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The social identity model for women is also comparatively better at “correctly”
predicting respondent partisanship than it is for men. The difference between the
social identity and rational choice models for women in “correctly” predicting re-
spondent party ID only ranges from 4.33% to 5.96%. This is much less than the
male difference in “correct” prediction between the two models (which ranges from
6.47% to 10.99%). These pattern is evident in the percentage of respondents pre-
dicted “poorly” as well. While the difference between the social identity and rational
choice models for women in “poorly” predicting respondent party ID ranges from
4.21% to 6.16%, the difference for men ranges from 3.89 to 9.56. This indicates that
the social identity and rational choice models for women are generally more alike in
the % of respondents whose partisan direction they predict wildly inaccurately. For
men, the rational choice model classifies respondents “poorly” more noticeably less
than the social identity model.
The conclusion to draw from these comparisons is that even though the rational
choice model is better at explaining partisanship than the social identity model for
both men and women, there is a substantial gender difference in how much better it
is. For men, the rational choice model is much better at accounting for partisanship
than the social identity model. Ideology is much more important for male party ID
than demographics. For women, however, the rational choice model is better than
the social identity model, but not by that much. Ideology is only somewhat more
important for female partisanship than demographics.
The evidence in Table 4.4 supports Hypothesis 9A. The social identity model
is comparatively better for women than men, because for women it more favorably
compares to the competing rational choice model. The findings in Table 4.4 confirm
Hypothesis 9B.
Table 4.4 shows that the causes of partisanship, though similar for men and
women, vary in importance by gender. Both ideology and demographics significantly
explain partisanship for men and women. However, ideology is comparatively more
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important for male party ID, and demographics are comparatively more important
for female partisanship.
These gender variations in the applicability of the social identity and rational
choice models underscore the fact that the models themselves are significantly dif-
ferent for women and men. This is something one should expect if the causes of
partisanship are different for the two genders.
Table 4.5 demonstrates that this is the case. Chow tests show that the rational
choice model regression coefficients (the same as those depicted in Tables 4.2 and
4.3) for men are statistically distinct from those for women, and the social identity
model regression coefficients for women are significantly different from those for men.
These differences hold across all four datasets, and support Hypotheses 10A and 10B.
Though statistically distinct, the rational choice model regressions for men and
women are similar in that Ideology has the same significant direction of effect on
partisanship for both genders. However, the social identity regressions for men and
women are substantively different as well as statistically distinct. Table 4.5 shows
that there are demographics in all four datasets, including Age, No HS Degree, Only
College Degree, Catholic, and Married, which have significantly different effects on
male and female partisanship. Some of these demographics are significant for one
gender but not the other. Others are significant and take one direction of effect for
one gender, but insignificant with the opposite effect for the other gender.
These instances are highlighted in bold in Table 4.5. They provide further evi-
dence that the causes of male and female partisanship are different. 18 It is unlikely
that these distinctions in the effects of demographics on male and female partisanship
occurred by chance. Differences in the effects of Only College Degree are present in
three of the four data sets, and differences in the effects of Age and Catholic identi-
fication occur in two of the four.
18As a side note, Table 4.5 also suggests that the potential for these differences in the causes
of male and female partisanship may be greater in small samples. Many of the differences in the
causes of male and female partisanship occur in the 2008-2009 NES Panel Study, which has the
smallest N of these datasets.
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These repeated variations in the impact of social identity demographics demon-
strate that the social identity models for women and men are not just statistically
different, but substantively different as well. In particular, the gender differences in
the effects of level of education warrant further investigation. The influence of edu-
cation on party ID generally is not as well understood as many scholar would believe.
For example, the effects of increasing education are often assumed to monotonically
cause greater Republican identification, but in fact these effect are non-linear.19 The
effects of age on partisanship should also be investigated more fully. All these find-
ings demonstrate that while the causes of partisanship for women and men overlap,
they are not the same.
19Having a college degree increases a respondent’s chances of identifying as Republican relative
to having lower education, but having an advanced degree increases a respondent’s chances of
identifying as a Democrat relative to having lower education.
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Table 4.5: Variable Differences & Chow Tests of Models for Men & Women
fake Rational Choice
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
Men
Intercept -.39** (.04) -.62** (.13) -.05 (.06) -.04 (.02)
Ideology 1.40** (.01) .82** (.03) .96** (.01) .91** (.00)
Women
Intercept -.63** (.04) -.76** (.11) -.32** (.05) -.03 (.02)
Ideology 1.42** (.01) .81** (.02) .99** (.01) .87** (.01)
Chow Test F-Statistic 40.89** 3.59** 19.18** 95.65**
fake Social Identity
Men
Intercept 3.02** (.08) 2.09** (.52) 2.95** (.15) 2.76** (.07)
Age -.01** (.00) -.01 (.01) -.00* (.00) .01** (.00)
No HS Degree .14 (.09) -1.21* (.64) -.37** (.13) -.06 (.10)
Post-Grad Degree -.20** (.06) -.97** (.25) -.42** (.08) -.70** (.04)
Only College Degree .21** (.05) -.26 (.23) .05 (.06) -.22** (.03)
Income .05** (.01) .06** (.03) .03** (.01) .03** (.00)
Black -1.69** (.06) -2.35** (.49) -2.46** (.10) -2.11** (.05)
Hispanic -.60** (.06) -.99** (.49) -.65** (.11) -.58** (.05)
Protestant .63** (.04) .76** (.22) .35** (.07) .79** (.03)
Catholic .29** (.05) .76** (.25) -.17** (.07) .49** (.04)
South .08** (.04) .52** (.21) .22** (.06) .21** (.03)
Married .54** (.04) .19 (.24) .28** (.06) .39** (.03)
Religiosity .28** (.01) .01** (.00) .26** (.02) .19** (.01)
Women
Intercept 2.70** (.08) 2.37** (.41) 2.91** (.12) 2.71** (.06)
Age -.01** (.00) -.03** (.01) -.01** (.00) -.00 (.00)
No HS Degree .02 (.10) .04 (.38) -.23** (.11) .05 (.10)
Post-Grad Degree -.65** (.07) -.79** (.23) -.85** (.07) -.80** (.05)
Only College Degree -.05 (.05) -.65** (.21) -.26** (.06) -.30** (.03)
Income .03** (.01) .09** (.02) .01** (.01) .02** (.00)
Black -1.75** (.06) -2.17** (.28) -2.65** (.07) -2.27** (.04)
Hispanic -.48** (.06) -.93** (.34) -.75** (.09) -.65** (.05)
Protestant .52** (.04) .82** (.19) .20** (.05) .67** (.03)
Catholic .03 (.05) .14 (.22) -.29** (.06) .31** (.04)
South .19** (.04) .50** (.19) .36** (.05) .31** (.03)
Married .47** (.04) .53** (.18) .46** (.05) .35** (.03)
Religiosity .38** (.01) .01** (.00) .31** (.01) .24** (.01)
Chow Test F-Statistic 27.70** 1.74** 15.33** 56.63**
#s rounded to 2 decimals
** indicates p < .05
* indicates p < .1
Standard errors in ()
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The rational choice and social identity theories of partisanship are broadly de-
scriptive and have important implications for American political behavior. Both
theories explain much about how Americans come to identify with the Democrats or
Republicans, and the meaning of partisanship for the average person. However, the
ability of each theory to accurately model the real world varies, both by time and
circumstance.20 As such, it is critical for scholars to understand when each theory
better describes empirical phenomena.
Aggregate studies of political behavior (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006) have
found that the rational choice theory generally outperforms the social identity the-
ory in explaining partisanship. It is valuable that this conclusion has been rapidly
transmitted throughout the scholarly community. However, this finding has been
received too casually and without deeper consideration. Political scientists have
needed to thoroughly analyze when the rational choice theory, effective at the ag-
gregate level, describes partisanship less accurately among important segments of
the American public. Abramowitz and Sauders (2006) gave us one example already
(Americans who identify as black), and it would astonishing if there were not more.
It is not surprising, then, that this analysis reveals substantial differences in
the causes of partisanship for women and men. The rational choice model explains
partisanship better than the social identity model for both men and women, which is
expected given the strongly ideological character of contemporary American parties.
However, there is considerable variation between genders in how much better
the rational choice model is. For men, the rational choice model far outstrips the
social identity model in its ability to explain partisanship. It is more correlated with
20Ideology and the associated rational choice theory have become much more related to parti-
sanship over time (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Bafumi and
Shapiro 2009, Abramowitz 2010). Recall that early political studies of mass political behavior
like The American Voter found that partisanship usually had little relationship with Americans’
ideology and issue positions (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).
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party ID, has fitted values substantially closer to the true values, and is better at
“correctly” predicting individuals’ partisanship. Ideology is much more important
for male partisanship than demographics.
For women, the rational choice model is better than the social identity model,
but not by that much and not nearly as much as it is for men. The social identity
and rational choice models are closer in their ability to account for female partisan-
ship. Demographics are more related to party ID and better at predicting individual
partisanship for women, and thus a more important part of partisanship for women.
Thus, the social identity model is comparatively better for women and the rational
choice model is comparatively better for men. The causes of partisanship for men
and women are overlapping, but not the same. Chow tests show that rational choice
models for women and men are significantly different, and social identity models
for women and men are distinct as well. Additionally, while ideology’s relationship
with partisanship is similar for men and women, with comparable significance and
direction of effect, that is not the case for various demographics. The relationship
between partisanship and age, level of education, Catholicism, and marital status
vary by gender in significance and direction of effect.
These findings are critical to explaining how partisanship functions in the real
world. Ultimately, if political scientists are going to understand voting, elections,
public opinion, and many other phenomena, we have to be able to thoroughly explain
partisanship, the “unmoved mover” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).
This paper provides two important conclusions about partisanship that should spur
new research.
The first is that the causes of partisanship are different for men and women.
This finding adds to the growing literature on the gender gap, and provides a basis
for further analysis. Future research should incorporate the idea that partisanship
means different things for men and women into both theory and empirical analysis,
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since party ID influences many other kinds of political behavior that men and women
have been found to vary in.
However, while the causes of partisanship are different for women and men, they
overlap considerably.21 This conclusion fits well with research like Kellstedt, Peter-
son, and Ramirez (2010) and others, which show that while political behavior often
varies between men and women, the underlying processes that cause such behavior
are similar. There is sufficient gender variation to warrant separate analyses in many
cases, but also much in common to justify aggregate evaluations.
The second essential conclusion of this paper is that distinctions in levels of
analysis are crucial. Evaluating political behavior at an aggregate level is important,
but so is analyzing it among important subgroups of the American population. Given
the differences between men and women in how well the rational choice and social
identity models explain partisanship, to infer that one model or the other is simply
superior in all cases presents a serious risk of ecological fallacy. As political scientists,
we are often too quick to make inferences about subgroups based on aggregate data.22
In the past, this might have been acceptable due to the lack of sufficient data to
examine relationships among important subgroups of the American population. Now,
however, with great big data sources like the CCES, NAES, and others (such as
Catalyst data), this kind of analysis is both possible and imperative.
How well the rational choice and social identity models explain partisanship varies
between large segments of the American public. The relationship between relevant
21Interestingly, while the causes of partisanship overlap a lot for men and women, the causes
themselves don’t. Respondents whose partisanship is “correctly” predicted by either the rational
choice model or social identity model are highly likely not to be identified “correctly” by the
other model! Across genders and all four data sets, the probability of a partisan being “correctly”
identified by both models ranges from about one in thirty five (less than 2.86%) to one in thirteen
(less than 7.70%). Table C-1 in Appendix C has these results. This finding is more than just
a casual curiosity. It suggests that Sniderman and Stiglitz (2012) are correct: Contemporary
American politics features a sizable group of social-identity, American Voter -like partisans and
an even larger group of rational-choice, ideology-based partisans, and these are generally distinct
groups.
22The reverse tendency can also be a problem. When political scientists focus overzealously on
analyzing subgroups of the American population, it becomes very difficult to build general theories.
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demographics and partisanship is not as clear as we might believe it to be, especially
for age and education. What holds true in the aggregate, or for one group, may not
hold true for another. Gelman, Shor, Bafumi, and Park (2008) famously demonstrate
that this is true of income and partisan vote choice. Future research should robustly
examine the relationships between demographics and partisanship among important
subgroups, and determine when the aggregate, bird’s-eye view of these relationships
is true and when it is not. My future research will analyze the implications of these
conclusions.
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V CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation gives us a new theory of partisanship. By taking into account
personality traits, I provide a clear but profound explanation for why some people
identify as pure independents, independent leaners, weak partisans, and strong par-
tisans. These categories tell us a great deal about how likely someone is to turnout
to vote, vote for a particular party, seek out partisan news sources, and be politi-
cally informed, among many other things, so being able to explain them is incredibly
valuable.
My conflict-oriented, group identity theory fits very well between existing rational
choice and social identity theories of partisanship. Like rational choice, it places
emphasis on the individual preferences and the source of those preferences. Similar
to social identity theories, my theory considers joining groups to be crucial. However,
my theory is neither a purely rational choice or social identity theory, and as a result
is able to transcend both.
There are many potential implications of the conflict-oriented group identity the-
ory. One of those implications is explored and analyzed in this dissertation. I show
here that male and female differences in Need to Evaluate and joiner status are re-
sponsible for a considerable part of the gender gap in strength of partisanship. Nev-
ertheless, there are certainly other implications of this theory, which has changed the
way I view partisanship. Joiner status and Need to Evaluate might influence what
kinds of political participation individuals are predisposed to, what campaign tactics
will be most effective on them, and when they will switch parties.
These two traits also, of course, provide an explanation for the gender gap in
sources of partisanship demonstrated above. One potential reason that the rational
choice model of partisanship is a comparatively better model of partisanship for men
is higher male Need to Evaluate. A plausible reason that the social identity model
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of partisanship is a comparatively better of partisanship for women is higher female
joiner status.
In this dissertation, I demonstrate support for interesting findings about the rela-
tionship between social group demographics and male and female party identification.
However, these results are by no means exhaustive. If anything, my conclusions ex-
hort political scientists to do more research on the causes of partisanship, both at
an aggregate level and among important subgroups of the American population.
Why an American identifies as a strong or weak Republican or Democrat, or
pure or leaning independent cannot always be explained, even by that person. In
this dissertation, though, I expound a powerful theory of partisanship helps minimize
our ignorance. May this greater knowledge increase our respect for one of our greatest
choices.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR “THE CONFLICT-ORIENTED GROUP
IDENTITY OF PARTISANSHIP”
To provide verification of conceptual and theoretical validity, I present the results
of additional analyses here. Those not familiar with research on Need to Evaluate
may wonder if it is the same as political sophistication. It is not. Need to Evaluate is
a social-psychological personality trait, and exists above and beyond political interest
or sophistication. A person high in Need to Evaluate, for example, would also be
expected to have strong preferences toward film, food, and consumer goods. Someone
high in Need to Evaluate may not even like politics!
To show that this is the case, I compare the correlations between Need to Evalu-
ate and several measures of political information and political sophistication. Table
A-1 shows the results. Talking Politics measures the number of days per week that
respondents talk about politics. Watching TV News is the number of days per week
that respondents watch TV news. Views Internet News is the number of days per
week that respondents view Internet news. Political Interest measures how interested
respondents are in information about government and politics, and ranges from “Not
interested at all” to “Slightly interested” to “Moderately interested” to “Very inter-
ested” to “Extremely interested.” Structural Political Knowledge is the number of
correct answers that a respondent gives to six questions about the structure of Amer-
ican government. The measure includes questions about the length of terms in the
House, Senate, and Presidency, as well as questions about the number of Senators
from each state, Presidential succession, and veto override percentages. Campaign
Political Knowledge is the number of correct answers that a respondent gives to six
questions about the 2008 Presidential campaign. The measure includes questions
about McCain and Obama’s home states, religions, and occupations prior to enter-
ing politics. Presidential Debates Watched is the number of Presidential debates
that respondents watched in 2008.
Table A-1 shows that Need to Evaluate is definitively not the same as political
knowledge or political sophistication. Need to Evaluate does have correlations over .3
with Talking Politics and Political Interest, which are large correlations for behavioral
variables. However, these correlations are nowhere near a level that would suggest
that Need to Evaluate and political sophistication are the same concept. Need to
Evaluate is not conceptually or theoretically the same as political sophistication or
information, and the correlations displayed in Table A-1 show that Need to Evaluate
is not empirically the same either.
In addition to demonstrating that Need to Evaluate is not the same as other
explanatory variables important for analyzing political behavior, I show that Need
to Evaluate has theoretically expected relationships with other important variables
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Table A-1: Correlations Between Need to Evaluate and Several Measures of
Political Information/Sophistication
Need to Evaluate
Talking Politics .32*
Watches TV News .10*
Views Internet News .13*
Political Interest .36*
Structural Political Knowledge .19*
Campaign Political Knowledge .13*
Presidential Debates Watched .20*
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
in political behavior. Specifically, I find further evidence that having a high Need to
Evaluate leads an American to evaluate the Republican and Democratic parties in
a bipolar, or diametrically opposing way (see Federico 2007). Table A-2 shows that
having a high Need to Evaluate leads to lower levels of ambivalence between the two
parties.
In Table A-2, I display the results of a linear regression of Lack of Party Am-
bivalence on Need to Evaluate and control variables. Lack of Party Ambivalence is
a nine-point scale, measured so that the more positive a respondent is about one
party and more negative he or she is about the other, the higher the scale value. The
results in Table A-2 show that Need to Evaluate has a statistically and substantively
significant effect on Lack of Party Ambivalence. All else equal, a respondent that
moves from the median value of the Need to Evaluate scale (.5) to the highest value
(1) is expected to be over a point less ambivalent on the nine-point Lack of Party
Ambivalence scale.
Need to Evaluate and joiner status are also not the same as any of the other
explanatory variables used in my analyses, and there are no problems of perfect
collinearity that could confound the results I displayed earlier. Table A-3 displays the
correlations between Need to Evaluate, joiner status, and these explanatory variables.
None of the correlations are anywhere close to high enough to cause concerns about
multicollinearity.
For interested readers, I also provide the results for one of my key analyses with
an additional control variable included. Table A-4 depicts the results of an ordered
probit of strength of partisanship on Need to Evaluate, joiner status, strength of
ideology, and controls. This model is the same as the one depicted in Table 2.2,
but with strength of ideology included as an additional control variable. Strength
of ideology should not be included as an explanatory variable in a model that has
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Table A-2: OLS Regression of Lack of Party Ambivalence Scale on Need to
Evaluate and Controls
Estimate Std. Error
Intercept .8* .38
Need to Evaluate 2.2* .32
Male -.06 .13
Age .00 .00
Education .22* .07
Income -.01 .02
Black .33 .26
Religiosity -.00 .00
Catholic -.33* .16
South -.02 .15
Married -.03 .15
Residual standard error = 2.132
N of sample = 1124
Adjusted R2 = .06
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
strength of partisanship as its dependent variable, since partisanship significantly
determines ideology (Carsey and Layman 2006) and this creates endogeneity prob-
lems through reverse causality. As a result, strength of ideology is not included in
the model reported in the main body of the paper, and should not be.
Table A-3 shows that the correlation between Need to Evaluate and strength of
ideology is not nearly high enough to suspect high multicollinearity or that the two
variables are empirically the same in the data. Nonetheless, I include the model
results in Table A-4 in Appendix A so readers can see that inappropriately including
strength of ideology in this model does not wash out the influence of Need to Evaluate.
The results presented in Table A-4 show that Need to Evaluate remains a highly
significant predictor of strength of partisanship even when strength of ideology is
improperly included in the model.1
1Joiner status remains marginally significant at p<.11.
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Table A-3: Correlation Between Need to Evaluate, Joiner Status, and Explanatory
Variables
Need to Evaluate Joiner Status
Need to Evaluate - .08*
Joiner Status .08* -
Male .1* -.08*
Age .02 .17*
Education .11* .28*
Income .06* .2*
Black -.01 .01
Religiosity -.02 .33*
Catholic -.07* .02
South .00 .02
Married -.01 .11*
Strength of Ideology .18* .15*
Ideology -.04# .05#
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
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Table A-4: Ordered Probit of SPID on Need to Evaluate, Joiner Status, & Controls
& Strength of Ideology
Estimate Std. Error
Need to Evaluate .46* .18
Joiner Status .08 .05
Male -.28* .07
Age .00 .00
Education .06 .04
Income -.02# .01
Black .62* .16
Religiosity -.00 .00
Catholic .01 .09
South -.05 .08
Married .18* .08
Strength of Ideology .53* .04
Tau1 -.13 .22
Tau2 .64* .22
Tau3 1.42* .22
Residual deviance = 2331.31
N of sample = 1018
AIC = 2361.31
# indicates p < .1
* indicates p < .05
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APPENDIX B
SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR “CONFLICT, GROUPS, AND THE
GENDER GAP IN STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP”
Assessing How Much Need to Evaluate and Joiner Status Affect the Gender Gap,
Separately for Men and Women
Using the profile median male and female respondent, I compare their probabil-
ities of identifying as independent leaners and weak partisans given their gender’s
average Need to Evaluate and joiner status with what those probabilities would be
if they had the average levels of Need to Evaluate and joiner status of the whole
sample. This allows me to compare how different male and female strength of par-
tisanship would be if men and women had the same average Need to Evaluate and
joiner status with how different male and female strength of partisanship are given
their different average Need to Evaluate and joiner status. The sample’s median
respondent is a 51-year-old, married, non-black respondent who is not Catholic and
who has graduated from high school. The sample average Need to Evaluate is .58
and sample average joiner status is 1.16.
To assess how much of the gender gap in strength of partisanship that Need to
Evaluate and joiner status explain, I use predicted probabilities. Using the profile
median male and female respondent, I compare their probabilities of identifying
as independent leaners and weak partisans given their gender’s average Need to
Evaluate and joiner status with what those probabilities would be if they had the
average levels of Need to Evaluate and joiner status of the whole sample. This allows
me to compare how different male and female strength of partisanship would be if
men and women had the same average Need to Evaluate and joiner status with how
different male and female strength of partisanship are given their different average
Need to Evaluate and joiner status. The sample’s median respondent is a 51-year-
old, married, non-black respondent who is not Catholic and who has graduated from
high school. The sample average Need to Evaluate is .58 and sample average joiner
status is 1.16.
Table B-1 shows that the sample’s median respondent, if male and with the
average male Need to Evaluate, will choose to identify as a leaner instead of a pure
independent about 70% of the time. If that same median respondent is female, with
the average female Need to Evaluate, she will only choose to be a leaner instead of
a pure independent 62% of the time. Of this 8% difference, approximately 12.5% of
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it (1% out of 8%) is caused by the difference in the average level of male and female
Need to Evaluate.2
Joiner status does not explain as much of the difference in leaner identification
as Need to Evaluate does. Table B-1 depicts that the sample’s median respondent,
if male and with the average male joiner status, will choose to identify as a leaner
instead of a strong partisan about 36.5% of the time. If that same median respondent
is female, with the average female joiner status, she will only choose to be a leaner
instead of a strong partisan 29.5% of the time. About 7% of this 7% difference is
caused by the difference in the average level of male and female joiner status.
Both Need to Evaluate and joiner status account for a larger part of why men
are less likely to identify as weak partisans than women. The sample’s median
respondent, if male and with the average male Need to Evaluate, will identify as a
weak partisan instead of strong partisan approximately 40% of the time. In contrast,
if that same median respondent is woman, with the average female Need to Evaluate,
she will identify as a weak partisan instead of a strong partisan about 49% of the time.
The difference in average male and female Need to Evaluate explains a whopping
28.5% of this identification gap!
Joiner status also accounts for why men are less likely to identify as weak partisans
than women. The sample’s median respondent, if male and with the average male
joiner status, will identify as a weak partisan instead of pure independent about
70.5% of the time. If the sample median respondent is instead a woman, with the
average female joiner status, she will choose to identify as a weak partisan instead
of pure independent about 79.5% of the time. The difference in average male and
female joiner status explains about 11% of this 9 percentage point gap.
2This is derived by calculating the predicted probabilities of identifying as a leaner instead of
a pure independent for the male and female median respondents if they both have the same Need
to Evaluate, the sample average (.58), instead of their gender’s average Need to Evaluate (.6 and
.56 respectively). The gap between the sample median male and female respondents’ probability
of identifying as a leaner instead of a pure independent if they have the sample average Need
to Evaluate (69.5% - 62.5% = 7%) instead of their gender’s average Need to Evaluate is then
subtracted from the (greater) probability gap if they have their gender’s average Need to Evaluate
(70% - 62% = 8%). The remaining percent (8% - 7% = 1%) is the fraction of the gap (1%/8% =
12.5%) explained by the difference in the average male Need to Evaluate and average female Need
to Evaluate.
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Table B-1: Sample Median Respondent’s Probabilities of Leaner & Weak Partisan Identification
for Women and Men, the Difference Between Them, & % of Difference Explained by Gender
Differences in Need to Evaluate and Joiner Status
Male Female Difference % of Difference Explained
Pr(Leaner Over
Pure Independent) 70% 62% 8% 12.5% (by N2E)
Pr(Leaner Over
Strong Partisan) 36.5% 29.5% 7% 7% (by joiner status)
Pr(Weak Partisan Over
Strong Partisan) 40% 49% 9% 28% (by N2E)
Pr(Weak Partisan Over
Pure Independent) 70.5% 79.5% 9% 11% (by joiner status)
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APPENDIX C
SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR “RATIONAL CHOICE, SOCIAL
IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCES IN HOW WOMEN AND MEN IDENTIFY AS
REPUBLICANS OR DEMOCRATS”
Table C-1: Overlap in “Correct” Partisanship Predictions Between Rational Choice and Social
Identity Models
Men
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES Panel 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
% of Social Identity’s
Correct Predictions That
Rational Choice Gets Right 37.48 37.50 24.61 41.60
fake
% of Rational Choice’s
Correct Predictions That
Social Identity Gets Right 22.37 18.90 16.42 28.02
fake
% of Total Respondents’
Partisanship Correctly
Predicted By Both Models 5.86 4.72 2.89 6.66
fake
Women
2006 CCES 2008-2009 NES Panel 2008 NAES 2010 CCES
% of Social Identity’s
Correct Predictions That
Rational Choice Gets Right 36.52 47.27 23.32 33.53
fake
% of Rational Choice’s
Correct Predictions That
Social Identity Gets Right 21.41 27.96 16.03 25.26
fake
% of Total Respondents’
Partisanship Correctly
Predicted By Both Models 5.35 7.41 2.84 5.42
Numbers rounded to
2 decimal places.
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